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T-REX, JURASSIC PARK AND NUCLEAR POWER:
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND THE COURTS AFTER
THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
SHIGENORI MATSUI*
You’re going to engineer a bunch of prehistoric animals and
set them on an island? Fine. A lovely dream. Charming. But
it won’t go as planned. It is inherently unpredictable . . .
–Ian Malcolm, in Jurassic Park (Michael Crichton)1
INTRODUCTION
As citizens of the only nation which has experienced devastating
disaster brought about by nuclear weapons, the Japanese people have
shown a strong reluctance towards nuclear power. Nevertheless, a very
strong government endorsement of nuclear power and the assurance of
its safety by nuclear scientists have pushed the Japanese to accept nuclear
power. Japan is an isolated island country with little natural resources.
Historically, Japan generated power by burning imported fossil fuels,
which made Japan heavily dependent on the Middle East. After the 1973
oil crisis, the Japanese government diversified its energy sources and came
to rely more and more upon nuclear power, which could provide a stable
source of power immune to international political disagreements. Before
2011, there were fifty-four nuclear reactors across Japan, producing about
30.8% of Japan’s electricity.2 In light of concerns over global warming,
the government emphasized the environmental benefits of nuclear power.
The government claimed that nuclear power was the most stable, environ-
mentally friendly, and economically efficient method of power production.
Residents opposed to the use of nuclear power have protested and
often filed lawsuits to stop the operation of nuclear power plants. However,
* Professor of Law, University of British Columbia, Peter A. Allard School of Law.
1 MICHAEL CRICHTON, JURASSIC PARK: A NOVEL 178 (Random House 2012).
2 KEIZAI SANGYÔSHÔ [MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY], HEISEI 22NEN
DENRYOKU KYOUKYU KEIKAKU NO GAIYOU MITSUITE [ON THE SUMMARY OF THE POWER
SUPPLY PLAN, 2010] (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/category/electricity
_and_gas/supply_plan/pdf/100414-h22.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3SF-5CRL] [hereinafter
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY]. At that time, it was anticipated that nuclear
power would account for 41% of Japan’s power by 2019. Id.
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the Japanese courts have been very reluctant to intervene and they have
essentially sided with the government and power companies to support
nuclear power.
Everything changed on March 11, 2011, when the Tohoku Earth-
quake caused the Fukushima nuclear accident. The accident clearly
demonstrated that nuclear power is fraught with risks, and that nuclear
accidents could cause serious damage. The risks were especially high for
Japan because the country experiences many powerful earthquakes every
year. Was this disaster enough to cause a change in the judicial attitude
towards nuclear power plants?
This Article examines the judicial response to nuclear power plants
in the post-Fukushima era. It will first outline the legal system responsi-
ble for regulating nuclear power plants in Japan in Part I. It will then
examine the judicial responses to the lawsuits filed by opposing residents,
environmentalists, and anti-nuclear power activists in Part II. Part III
of this Article will outline the devastating 2011 Fukushima nuclear acci-
dent that was caused by the Tohoku Earthquake, and will examine the
lessons that we can learn from the accident. Finally, Part IV of this Article
will examine the judicial response to nuclear power plants in the after-
math of the Fukushima nuclear accident.
This Article will show that, although some courts came to adopt
quite a skeptical stance against nuclear power in the post-Fukushima era,
generally the Japanese courts are still very supportive of nuclear power.
Simply put, they still trust government bureaucrats as well as science and
technology experts even after the Fukushima accident. However, in light
of the serious devastation that followed the Fukushima nuclear accident,
it may be apt to reconsider whether blindly trusting government bureau-
crats and experts is a good idea.
I. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS BEFORE THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR
ACCIDENT
A. Japan and Nuclear Power
Japan is the only country in the world that has actually experienced
nuclear bombs. On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped in
Hiroshima instantly killing some 80,000 residents.3 Some additional 16,600
3 HISTORY.COM, Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, http://www.history.com/topics
/world-war-ii/bombing-of-hiroshima-and-nagasaki [https://perma.cc/3R7M-QMKJ] (last
visited Nov. 12, 2017).
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residents died within four months because of the blast and radiation expo-
sure.4 On August 9, the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki.5
It is estimated that between 40,000 and 75,000 people died immediately
following the atomic explosion, while the total deaths resulting from the
bomb may have reached 80,000 by the end of 1945.6 Many survivors and
their children suffered from cancer and other health complications over
the following decades.7 Clearly, the Japanese people know about nuclear
power’s devastating effects and the risk associated with it.
However, Japan is an isolated island country and has very limited
natural resources. As a result, Japan has depended heavily on imports
for its primary energy needs. As it recovered from World War II and
started to rapidly develop its economy, Japan had to rely primarily on
fossil fuel imports, particularly oil, from the Middle East.8 This area is
politically volatile and is often affected by serious regional conflicts. The
1973 oil crisis caused the price of oil to skyrocket, sending Japan into a
panic over the fear that oil imports may stop.9 Japan learned a very
important lesson. It needed to diversify its energy sources and avoid
relying too heavily upon the Middle East. That realization forced the
government to place its primary focus on nuclear power.
Japan started the development of its nuclear power program in
1954. The Atomic Power Basic Act,10 which limited the use of nuclear
technology to peaceful purposes, was enacted in 1955. In the following
year, the Atomic Energy Commission (“AEC”) was established to promote
nuclear power development and its wider use.11 The Liberal Democratic
Party (“LDP”), a conservative party, which practically dominated the
4 ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND., Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—1945 (June 5, 2014),
http://www.atomicheritage.org/history/bombings-hiroshima-and-nagasaki-1945 [https://
perma.cc/ZAL3-M6P9] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017). The City of Hiroshima estimates that
237,000 people ended up dying because of the bomb.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See RADIATION EFFECTS RES. FOUND., Solid cancer risks among atomic-bomb survivors,
http://www.rerf.jp/radefx/late_e/cancrisk.html [https://perma.cc/A9D9-JJFY] (last visited
Nov. 12, 2017).
8 SHIGEN ENERGY CHÔ [AGENCY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY], ENERGY HAKUSHO
2016 [WHITEPAPER ON ENERGY, 2016], 2-1-3, http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/about/white
paper/2016html/2-1-3.html [https://perma.cc/MU6U-4BCF]. In 2014, Japan imported
99.7% of its oils from foreign countries, 80% of which came from the Middle East.
9 See R. P. Sinha, Japan and the Oil Crisis, 30(8) WORLD TODAY 335, 335, 338 (1974).
10 Genshiryoku kihonhô [Atomic Power Basic Act], Law No. 186 of 1955 (Japan) [herein-
after Atomic Power Basic Act].
11 ATOMIC ENERGY COMM’N, Role of the Atomic Energy Commission, http://www.aec.go.jp
/jicst/NC/about/index.htm [https://perma.cc/M2LG-6HMV].
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government from 1955 until 2009, strongly advanced a pro-nuclear power
policy. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (“MITI”) and its
successor, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (“METI”), have
played a fundamental role in encouraging power companies to develop
nuclear power plants, largely through its subsidiary organization, the
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (“ANRE”).
However, government agencies and power companies are not the
only parties that have promoted nuclear energy. Many local governments,
especially those in rural areas where a declining population and a declining
industry jeopardize their survival, have been eager to accept nuclear power
plants in exchange for economic benefits.12 Backed by a large amount of
research funding, nuclear scientists who support nuclear development have
provided assurances that nuclear power is safe, all while enjoying a privi-
leged position within Japan’s academia. So-called entire “nuclear villages”13
have been supporting and advancing nuclear power. As a result, there
was a widely believed myth among the public, the so-called “safety myth”
of nuclear power, that nuclear power was safe and could be completely
controlled; that is to say, there would be no serious nuclear accident.14
With the support of this myth, the number of active nuclear reactors
in Japan gradually increased to fifty-four,15 with nuclear power account-
ing for 30.8% of all power produced in 2011.16 It was anticipated at that
time that nuclear power would account for 41% of all power produced by
2019.17 Global warming and the need to reduce Japan’s carbon emissions
12 Local governments can expect employment of local residents, increased tax revenue
and an increase in nuclear power plant-related industries. Moreover, the central govern-
ment distributed a huge amount of money as a subsidy to promote the acceptance of
nuclear power plants. See infra note 39.
13 Jeff Kingston, Japan’s Nuclear Village, 10(37) ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL 1 (2012), http://
apjjf.org/-Jeff-Kingston/3822/article.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDX9-4KEC].
14 Akihiro Horiuchi, Naze genpatsu no anzen shinwa wa umaretanoka [How the safety myth
of the nuclear power was created], IT BUSINESS MEDIA (June 19, 2012), http://bizmakoto
.jp/makoto/articles/1206/19/news023.html [https://perma.cc/XD7K-7NUW] (Japan); Yuki
Tanaka, Japan’s Safe Nuclear Myth, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 25, 2011), http://thediplomat
.com/2011/03/japans-safe-nuclear-myth/ [https://perma.cc/SH9H-5KJU]; Norimitsu Onishi,
‘Safety Myth’ Left Japan Ripe for Nuclear Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2011), http://www
.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/world/asia/25myth.html?_r=0.
15 See MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 2. See also NIHON
GENSHIRYOKU BUNKA ZAIDAN [JAPAN ATOMIC ENERGY RELATIONS ORGANIZATION], Zenkoku
no genshiryoku hatsudensho no joukyou [Current status of nuclear power plant all over
Japan] (Sept. 1, 2011), https://www.jaero.or.jp/data/02topic/fukushima/pdf/0901unten
joukyou.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY9F-KFKV].
16 See MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 2.
17 Id. For the current estimate, see infra note 303.
2017] T-REX, JURASSIC PARK AND NUCLEAR POWER 149
prompted the Japanese government to rely more on nuclear power instead
of fossil fuels. The Japanese government strongly promoted nuclear power,
claiming that nuclear power was the most stable, environmentally friendly,
and economically efficient method of power production.18
B. Government Regulation over Nuclear Power Plants
Of course, the government heavily regulates the use of nuclear
power, as well as the construction and operation of nuclear power plants.
These regulations are meant to ensure that nuclear power plants remain
safe, and to prevent serious accidents that would cause grave damage to
nearby residents as well as to the public.19
As we already noted, the fundamental policies for using nuclear
power were established by the Atomic Power Basic Act.20 It declared that
the use of nuclear power is restricted for peaceful purposes and that the de-
velopment and use of nuclear power should be conducted autonomously
under the democratic operation aspiring to secure safety.21 AEC was estab-
lished to enforce the government’s nuclear policy systematically and to
ensure the democratic operation of nuclear administration.22 The AEC’s
role is to prepare, review, and decide anything related to the use of nuclear
power.23 The Atomic Power Basic Act requires any individual who wishes
18 SHIGEN ENERGY CHÔ [AGENCY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY], ENERGY KIHON
KEIKAKU [ENERGY BASIC PLAN] at 10, 27 (June 2010), http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/cate
gory/others/basic_plan/pdf/100618honbun.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAT5-GYPH].
19 The regulatory system before the Fukushima accident is summarized at Research
Organization for Information Science and Technology, Hatsudenyô genshiro no anzen
kisei no gaiyô [Outline of safety regulation of nuclear power reactor for power generation],
ATOMICA (Dec. 2012), http://www.rist.or.jp/atomica/data/dat_detail.php?Title_No=11-02
-01-01 [https://perma.cc/VD23-NJR2] [hereinafter Outline of Reactor Regulation Law],
and the new regulatory system after the establishment of the Nuclear Regulation
Authority (“NRA”) in 2012 is summarized at Research Organization for Information
Science and Technology, Genshirotô kiseihô no gaiyô [Outline of the nuclear reactor regu-
lation law], ATOMICA (Dec. 2012) 1, http://www.rist.or.jp/atomica/data/dat_detail.php
?Title_Key=10-07-01-05 [https://perma.cc/D75U-P5QT].
20 Atomic Power Basic Act, supra note 10.
21 Id. at art. 2.
22 Id. at art. 4.
23 Id. at art. 5. After the NRA was established, matters on the safety measures of nuclear
power plants were no longer within the jurisdiction of the AEC, but the NRA; see id. at
art. 3-2, 5; Genshiryoku anzen kisei ni kansuru soshiki-tô no kaikaku no kihon hôshin
[Basic Policy on the Reform of an Organization in charge of Nuclear Safety Regulation 
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to construct nuclear reactors to follow government regulations under a
separate statute.24 It also mandates that any interested individuals must
submit an operation plan and receive government approval before they
may begin operation.25
The Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act established the regulatory
scheme for nuclear power plants.26 According to the Nuclear Reactor
Regulation Act, a power company that wishes to establish a nuclear reactor
to generate power (power-generating nuclear reactor) needs to obtain a
government permit.27 There has been a change regarding who has the
power to grant this permit. Initially the prime minister had this power,
but it was later vested with the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
(regulatory power was actually enforced by the Nuclear and Industrial
Safety Agency (“NISA”), an agency in the ANRE, and the Nuclear Safety
Commission (“NSC”) was created from the AEC to supervise on the safety
issues).28 After the Fukushima accident, the power to grant permits fell
to the Nuclear Regulation Authority (“NRA”), an agency within the Min-
istry of Environment.29 Despite these changes, the overall regulatory
system has not been altered much.
The government is prohibited from granting a permit unless the
application satisfies the following four criteria30:
(Cabinet Decision) 15 Aug. 2011, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/pdf/kakugi_en_110
815.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9HE-JTWG].
24 Atomic Basic Power Act, supra note 10, at art. 14; see Kakugenryou busshitsu, kakun-
enryou busshitsu oyobi genshiro no kisei nikansuru hôritsu [Act Concerning the Regulation
on Nuclear Raw Materials, Nuclear Fuel Materials and Nuclear Reactor], Law No. 166
of 1957, art. 3 (Hôrei teikyô dçta Shisutemu [Hôrei DB]), http://www.oecd-nea.org/law
/legislation/jpn-material-reactors.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7BQ-LF93] (Japan) [hereinafter
Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act].
25 Atomic Power Basic Act, supra note 10, at art. 16.
26 Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act, supra note 24, at art. 1.
27 Id. at art. 43-3-5 (after 2012 amendment) (Before the 2012 amendment, all nuclear
reactors were treated the same, but the 2012 amendment introduced a distinction between
commercial power-generating nuclear reactor and others).
28 Hideaki Shiroyama, Nuclear Safety Regulation in Japan and Impacts of the Fukushima
Daiichi Accident, REFLECTIONS ON THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 284 (J.
Ahn et al. eds., 2015); New Japanese Regulator Takes Over, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS
(Sep. 19, 2012), http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-New_Japanese_regulator_takes
_over-1909125.html [https://perma.cc/PCE2-4ZZN] [hereinafter New Japanese Regulator
Takes Over]; see Outline of Reactor Regulation Law, supra note 19, at 1.
29 Shiroyama, supra note 28, at 284, 288.
30 Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act, supra note 24, at art. 43-3-6 (after 2012 amendment)
(Before the 2012 amendment, these criteria were stipulated in art. 24 of the Nuclear
Reactor Regulation Act).
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(1) there is no danger that the proposed power-generating
nuclear reactor would be used for anything other than
peaceful purposes,
(2) the applicant has the necessary technical capacity and
financial basis to establish the power-generating nuclear
reactor,
(3) the applicant has the technical capacity necessary to im-
plement countermeasures to prevent or contain any serious
accidents and otherwise to operate the power-generating
nuclear reactor properly, and,
(4) the location, structure, and equipment of the proposed
power-generating nuclear reactor satisfies government
standards . . . such as are sufficient to prevent disaster to
be caused by nuclear fuel materials, anything contaminated
by nuclear fuel materials, or the nuclear reactor itself.
If the power company wants to modify the fundamental design of
the power-generating nuclear reactor, it needs to obtain a permit for the
proposed modifications.31 Also, before construction begins, the power com-
pany must obtain approval for its construction plan.32 Moreover, the facility
must pass an inspection after construction is complete, before operations
start.33 If the construction involves welding, the power company must in-
spect the welding before operations begin and the result of that inspec-
tion needs to be recorded and kept.34 The government will also inspect the
facility’s organization, method, management of construction and other
factors to secure safety of the welding.35 Furthermore, the power company
needs to submit an operation plan for the proposed nuclear reactor.36 It
must also implement measures to ensure the safe operation of the nuclear
power plant, in addition to ensuring proper transport, storage, and disposal
of nuclear fuel materials or anything contaminated by the nuclear fuel
materials, even in the event of serious accident.37 It also needs to establish
a security protocol and submit it for approval before operation of the
power-generating nuclear reactor can begin.38
31 Id. at art. 43-3-9.
32 Id.
33 Id. at art. 43-3-11.
34 Id. at art. 43-3-13, para. 1.
35 Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act, supra note 24, at art. 43-3-13, para. 4.
36 Id. at art. 43-3-17.
37 Id. at art. 43-3-22.
38 Id. at art. 43-3-24, para 1. Before the 2012 amendment, there was no obligation to
retrofit the nuclear reactor after the permit had been granted. The 2012 amendment
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Of course, in order to build a nuclear power plant, it is politically
essential to obtain the support of the local government. The government
passed various statutes that provide many grants to local governments
who are willing to accept a nuclear power plant within their jurisdiction.39
This grant is a lucrative incentive for any local government and their
residents to accept the nuclear power plant.40
Moreover, in order to assure local residents that any kind of damage
will be compensated if an accident occurs, the government passed the
Nuclear Damage Award Act.41 The Act mandates that power companies
are to pay damages for any loss or injury related to nuclear accidents,
regardless of fault, except when the loss or injury is caused by an extraor-
dinarily huge natural disaster.42 It thus mandated the power companies
to secure sufficient damage award security. The power companies are
mandated to conclude nuclear damage insurance contracts backed up by
government reinsurance or to submit security deposits.43 It also man-
dated the government to intervene in case the total liability exceeds the
limits of the reinsurance or deposit.44 While this statute grants power
companies a sense of security, it also guarantees the local residents some
kind of assurance that their damages will be paid.45
The government can revoke the permit or order the suspension of
the operation of a nuclear power plant if there is a violation of the Nuclear
Reactor Regulation Act.46 Moreover, if the government later determines
requires the operator of the nuclear power plant to maintain the facility and ensure that
it complies with the current technical standards stipulated. Id. at art. 43-3-14.
39 Dengenkaihatsu sokushinzeihô [Act on Tax to Promote Development of Electricity
Power], Law No. 78 of 1979, at art. 1 (Japan); Tokubetsu kaikei nikansuru hôritsu [Act on
Special Finance Accounting], Law No. 23 of 2007, at art. 21-23, para. 2 (Japan) (formerly
Dengenkaihatsu sokushin taisaku tokubetsu kaikeihô [Act on Special Financial Account-
ing for Measures to Promote Development of Electricity Power], Law No. 80 of 1974) (Japan);
Hatsudenyô shisetsu shûhenchiiki seibihô [Act on Development of Adjacent Areas of the
Electricity Power Generation Facilities], Law No. 78 of 1979, at art. 1, 3 (Japan).
40 Act on Development of Adjacent Areas of the Electricity Power Generation Facilities,
supra note 39.
41 Genshiryoku songai no baisho ni kansuru hôritsu [Act on Damage Payment for Nuclear
Damages], Law No. 147 of 1961, at art. 1 (Japan).
42 Id. at art. 3. On the other hand, it relieved the liability of other parties involved such
as manufacturers or construction companies.
43 Id. at art. 6–7.
44 Id. at art. 16.
45 Placing a cap on the liability of the power company could be controversial. J. Mark
Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of
Japan, 13 THEORETICAL INQ. IN L. 457 (2012).
46 Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act, supra note 24, art. 43-3-20, para. 2.
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that the location, structure, or equipment of the facility does not satisfy
the fourth criterion of the requirements for a permit, the government may
order the operator of the facility to cease operations, modify its operation
protocols, repair or relocate the facility, adopt a different operation method
for the facility, or adopt any other necessary measures for security.47 The
government may do the same when the technical standards mandated by
the government are not met, or when the measures to ensure the safety
of the nuclear reactor facility’s operation, including the proper transport,
storage and disposal of nuclear fuel materials or anything contaminated by
the nuclear fuel materials, were not sufficient.48
As a result, the government and power companies have argued that
nuclear power plants are safe because of these extensive regulations.
II. LAWSUITS AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
A. Opposing Residents and the Courts
Some local residents, environmentalists, and anti-nuclear power
activists are naturally opposed to the construction and operation of nuclear
power plants, fearing that such activities may seriously harm the environ-
ment and the public.49 They also fear the possibility of a catastrophe
where a serious accident results in significant radiation contamination,
just like the Three Mile Island accident in 1979,50 or the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant accident in 1986.51 Even in Japan, a serious sodium leak ac-
cident occurred in the Monju fast-breeder facility in 1995,52 and several
47 Id. at art. 43-3-23, para. 1.
48 Id.
49 Suvendrini Kakuchi, Japanese Mothers Rise Up Against Nuclear Power, THE GUARDIAN
2 (Dec. 22, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/dec/22/japanese-moth
ers-rise-nuclear-power [https://perma.cc/MSV7-TQV9].
50 WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, Three Mile Island Accident (Mar. 2001), http://www.world-nu
clear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/three-mile-island
-accident.aspx [http://perma.cc/R2HP-9977] (last updated Jan. 2012) (a cooling malfunc-
tion in the nuclear power plant caused part of the nuclear core to melt, releasing radioactive
gas outside of the facility).
51 WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, Chernobyl Accident 1986, http://www.world-nuclear.org/infor
mation-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/chernobyl-accident.aspx [http://perma
.cc/4CPF-TUVJ] (last updated Nov. 2016) (a “flawed reactor design” of the nuclear power
plant together with “inadequately trained personnel” resulted in a steam explosion and
fires, “releas[ing] at least 5% of the radioactive reactor core into the atmosphere and
downwind,” killing two workers immediately and twenty-eight more “within a few weeks”
of the accident “as a result of acute radiation poisoning”).
52 H. Mikami, A. Shono & H. Hiroi, Sodium Leak at Monju (I)—Cause and Consequences,
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workers were killed by an accident at the nuclear fuel processing plant
of JOC in 1999.53 Moreover, Japan is a country surrounded by four differ-
ent tectonic plates,54 which subject the country to a tremendous number of
powerful earthquakes every year because of the subduction of one plate
under the different plates.55 Furthermore, there are an immeasurable num-
ber of active or hidden faults all over Japan.56 The movement of these
faults can suddenly cause very powerful earthquakes.57 A notable example
is the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, which was triggered by an active
fault directly underneath Kobe, one of the major cities in Japan.58 The
earthquake resulted in serious casualties (more than 6,400 residents
died or went missing because of the earthquake) and heavy damages
(more than 100,000 houses were totally destroyed),59 while raising seri-
ous concerns over the safety of nuclear power plants situated above or
near active faults.60 The opposing local residents, environmentalists, and
in IWGFR 92, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 271 (Nov. 1996), http://www.iaea.org/inis
/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/31/044/31044840.pdf [http://perma.cc/S246-8VNH].
53 WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, Tokaimura Criticality Accident, http://www.world-nuclear.org
/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/tokaimura-criticality-accident
.aspx [https://perma.cc/95P7-462W] (last updated Oct. 2013) (during the course of preparing
the fuel, a criticality accident occurred, exposing three workers to high doses of radiation).
54 NUCLEAR WASTE MGMT. ORG. OF JAPAN (NUMO), EVALUATING SITE SUITABILITY FOR A
HLW REPOSITORY, TECTONIC SETTING AND EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 20, 29 (Aug. 2004), http://
www.numo.or.jp/en/reports/pdf/Level3_SF_Final-06.pdf [http://perma.cc/UX8A-2Z33].
55 According to Professor Bruce D. Malamud, the average number of powerful earthquakes
in Japan from 1900 onwards is about seventeen magnitude-seven or greater earthquakes
per year (compared to about one magnitude-eight or greater earthquake per year). Dr.
Bruce Malamud Answers Questions on the Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami, ROYAL
GEOGRAPHICAL SOC’Y, at 12 (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.rgs.org/OurWork/Schools/School
+Members+Area/Ask+the+experts/Japanese+earthquake+and+tsunami.htm [https://perma
.cc/DZN5-7USM].
56 EARTHQUAKE RESEARCH COMMITTEE, REPORT: NATIONAL SEISMIC HAZARD MAPS FOR
JAPAN 15 (2005), http://www.jishin.go.jp/main/chousa/06mar_yosoku-e/NationalSeismic
HazardMaps.pdf [https://perma.cc/H83Q-UVE5].
57 Id. at 2, 10.
58 Id. at 1, 49, 53–54, 61.
59 Id. at 1; see also CITY OF KOBE, THE GREAT HANSHIN-AWAJI EARTHQUAKE STATISTICS
AND RESTORATION PROGRESS 1, 3–4 (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.city.kobe.lg.jp/safety/han
shinawaji/revival/promote/january.2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WXA-M889] (noting the
deaths that occurred in the City of Kobe alone).
60 The critical facility of the nuclear power plant was supposed to withstand the most
powerful earthquake, which could be caused by the active fault nearby, which was found
to have moved within the last 50,000 years. After the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, however,
the power company was required to consider the active fault, which moved within the last
120,000 to 130,000 years, so the nuclear power plant just above the active fault was
practically precluded. Takuji Koike, Genshiryoku hatsudensho no jishin risuku [Nuclear
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anti-nuclear power activists thus employed all the available methods to
protest and challenge the use of nuclear power.
One of the available avenues selected was a judicial challenge.
Indeed, an opposing public filed numerous lawsuits against various nuclear
power plants. There are two different routes to challenge nuclear power
plants. The first route is to challenge the government permit that allows
the construction or operation of the nuclear reactor. This first route takes
the form of a lawsuit seeking judicial revocation of the government per-
mit or declaration of its invalidity. The second route is to challenge the
action of the power companies that construct and operate nuclear power
plants. This second route usually takes the form of a lawsuit seeking an
injunction against the power companies. There are significant differences
between the first and second routes in Japan because a lawsuit challeng-
ing a government permit is an administrative case, which needs to follow
a different procedure under the Administrative Case Litigation Act,61
while regular civil suits such as a lawsuit against a power company only
need to follow the Code of Civil Procedure.62 In other words, if the plaintiffs
want to challenge the government permit, they need to follow a separate,
more onerous procedure.
B. Judicial Challenge Against a Government Permit
1. Threshold Questions
Opposing local residents, environmentalists and anti-nuclear power
activists can challenge the government grant of a permit for a nuclear
power plant. The Administrative Case Litigation Act authorizes the pub-
lic to file a suit seeking the revocation of an administrative order issued
by an administrative agency.63 Sometimes, the public will instead file a
suit seeking judicial declaration that the permit is invalid.64 With respect
to both suits, the first threshold question is one of standing. Because only
persons who have standing to challenge the government action may file
power plant’s risk for earthquake], REFERENCE (Nov. 2013), at 71, 81–82, 84. But there
was no legal ban on nuclear power plants just above an active fault; there was fear that
some of the faults might be active or there might be still-hidden active faults just under-
neath some of the nuclear power plants.
61 Gyousei jiken soshôhô [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 139 of 1962 (Japan).
62 Minji soshôhô [MINSOHÔ] [C. CIV. PRO.], Law No. 109 of 1996 (Japan).
63 Administrative Case Litigation Act, supra note 61, at art. 3, para. 2.
64 Id. at art. 3, para. 4.
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these suits,65 the government has challenged the standing of some plain-
tiffs. The leading case on this issue is comprised of the first two Monju
decisions.66
Monju is a fast-breeder nuclear reactor constructed and operated
by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (“JAEG”) (formerly Power Reactor
and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp, and subsequently Japan Nuclear
Cycle Development Institute).67 JAEG received the permit to construct
the nuclear reactor from the prime minister on May 27, 1983.68 On Sep-
tember 26, 1985, local residents filed a suit seeking a declaration that
this permit was invalid.69 The Fukui District Court initially dismissed
this administrative suit due to lack of standing.70 Upon appeal, the Nagoya
High Court, Kanazawa Branch, granted standing to residents who lived
within a 20 km radius of the nuclear reactor, while rejecting others.71
65 Id. at art. 9, para. 1; id. at art. 36. The difference between the revocation suit and the
declaration of invalidity suit is that the former would allow the court to negate the va-
lidity of the government action from the decision of the court, while the latter would allow
the courts to invalidate the administrative action from its start. It has been assumed that
a suit for declaration of invalidity is permissible only when there is a grave and manifest
illegality in the government action.
66 Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Sept. 22, 1992, 3rd petty bench, Hei 1 (Toz) no. 131, 46:6
SAIKÔ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÛ [MINSHÛ], at 1090 (Japan) [hereinafter Monju I];
Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Sept. 22, 1992, 3rd petty bench, Hei 1 (Toz) no. 130, 46:6
SAIKÔ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÛ [MINSHÛ], at 571 (Japan) [hereinafter Monju II].
67 R&D Institutes/Center, JAPAN ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.jaea.go.jp/english
/centers/ [https://perma.cc/AF67-Q23T] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017); see also Molly Lempriere,
Scrapping Monju: The Curtain Falls on Japan’s Experimental Fast Breeder Reactor,
POWER TECHNOLOGY (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.power-technology.com/features/feature
scrapping-monju-the-curtain-falls-on-japans-experimental-fast-breeder-reactor-5708445/
[https://perma.cc/F6Z4-ZF69].
68 Y. Matsuno, A Review of Fast Reactor Program in Japan, 52 INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
10 (Apr. 1984), http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/17/003/17
003585.pdf?r=1 [https://perma.cc/Q37E-USG3].
69 Philip White, Japan’s Supreme Court Snubs Citizens Over Monju, WISE/NIRS NU-
CLEAR MONITOR, June 10, 2005, at 3–4, https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/monon
line/nm629.pdf [https://perma.cc/72Y4-JCAJ]; see also Baku Nishio, Nuclear Court Cases
in Japan, CITIZEN’S NUCLEAR INFORMATION CENTER (CNIC) NUKE INFO TOKYO NO. 104,
Jan./Feb. 2005, at 6, http://www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/pdffiles/nit104.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7WWW-PK89]. The local residents also filed a civil suit against the Power Reactor
and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp seeking injunction against the construction and
operation of a nuclear reactor, but this suit was later dropped. Id.
70 Fukui Chihô Saibansho [Fukui Dist. Ct.], Dec. 25, 1987, 38:12 GYÔSEI JIKEN SAIBAN
REISHÛ [GYÔSHÛ], at 1829 (Japan).
71 Nagoya Kôtô Saibansho, Kanazawa Shibu [Nagoya High Ct., Kanazawa Branch], July 19,
1989, 40:7 GYÔSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHÛ [GYÔSHÛ], at 938 (Japan).
2017] T-REX, JURASSIC PARK AND NUCLEAR POWER 157
Article 9 of the Administrative Case Litigation Act grants standing
to file a revocation suit against administrative orders stipulated in Arti-
cle 3, section 2, to plaintiffs “who have legal interest.”72 The Supreme
Court of Japan [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court] held that anyone
whose legal rights or legally protected interests are infringed upon, or
will inevitably be infringed upon, by the impugned administrative order
should be allowed to file a revocation suit against it.73 When a regulatory
statute that authorizes an administrative order is meant to protect a
specific interest shared by a number of persons not only as a general public
interest but also as the personal interest of each concerned individual,
the Supreme Court has held that the interest should be viewed as a
legally protected interest that gives standing to file a revocation suit to
any individual whose aforementioned interest has been or will inevitably
be infringed upon.74 Whether the statute should be viewed as protecting
only the general public interest or as also protecting the personal interest
of individuals concerned should be decided by considering the overall
intent, purpose, content, and nature of the interest that is meant to be
protected by the administrative statute.75 The Supreme Court held that
this understanding should be applied to suits seeking a declaration of
invalidity authorized in Article 36 of the Administrative Case Litigation
Act76 as distinguished from suits seeking revocation as well.77
In regards to whether the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act could
be viewed as granting legal interest to file a suit for local residents to
challenge the permit to satisfy the standing requirement, the Supreme
Court viewed that the third criterion regarding technical capacity and
the fourth criterion regarding the satisfaction of safety standards creates
the responsibility of the government to prevent a nuclear disaster.78 It
reasoned that such requirements are necessary because a nuclear disaster
could seriously harm employees and local residents, and the subsequent
radiation contamination would severely damage the surrounding envi-
ronment. Therefore, it is essential that the permit holder has the nec-
essary technical capacity to ensure that the facility is safe.79 The criteria
were thus meant to ensure that the person permitted to construct the
72 Administrative Case Litigation Act, supra note 61, at art. 9.
73 Monju I, supra note 66.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Administrative Case Litigation Act, supra note 61, at art. 36.
77 Monju I, supra note 66.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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nuclear reactor has the necessary technical capacity to operate the nu-
clear power plant while satisfying the specified safety standards in light
of the location, structure, and equipment of the facility.80 If there were
any errors in this review, there is a possibility that a grave nuclear
accident might happen, threatening the safety and lives of residents that
live near the nuclear power plant.81 Due to the overall intent of the pro-
visions and the degree of potential damage, the Supreme Court held that
these provisions should be viewed not only as protecting the public and
the environment as a general public interest, but also as protecting the
life and safety of individual local residents living close to the nuclear
power plant by granting a legally protected personal interest.82 Further-
more, the Supreme Court held that whether the plaintiff lives in an area
where such direct and grave damages are likely to happen as a result of
a nuclear disaster should primarily depend on the distance between
plaintiff’s residence and the location of the nuclear reactor, while also
considering the kind of nuclear reactor involved, its structure, its capacity,
and other relevant factors.83 The Supreme Court then affirmed the High
Court holding, which granted standing to residents within a 20 km radius
from the plant (Monju I)84 and further granted standing to residents who
lived 29 km to even 58 km away from the plant (Monju II).85
This was a landmark decision, which cleared the way for local
residents to challenge government permits that allowed the construction
of nuclear reactors. On the other hand, it denied standing to those persons
who live too far away and might only have a serious concern with the
safety of the nuclear power plant.86 Therefore, environmentalists and
anti-nuclear power activists were precluded from joining plaintiffs unless
they lived within a certain distance of the nuclear power plant.87
2. Standard of Review
When the threshold questions are cleared, the next question is
how the reviewing court should review the legality of the permit.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Monju I, supra note 66.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Monju II, supra note 66.
86 See Monju I, supra note 66; Monju II, supra note 66.
87 The Supreme Court also accepted a suit for declaration of invalidity of government per-
mit as lawful. Monju I, supra note 66. The civil suit against the power company, it was
held, does not preclude a suit for declaration of invalidity. Id.
2017] T-REX, JURASSIC PARK AND NUCLEAR POWER 159
The leading case on this issue is the Ikata nuclear power plant
case.88 Reactor No. 1 of the Ikata nuclear power plant was granted a
permit on November 28, 1972,89 and local residents filed a suit seeking
the judicial revocation of a permit for the construction of a nuclear
reactor on August 27, 1973.90 Both the Matsuyama District Court91 and
the Takamatsu High Court92 dismissed their claims. On October 29, 1992,
the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s judgment and dismissed
all claims brought by the local residents.93
The Supreme Court found that a safety review conducted under
the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act must be a multifaceted and compre-
hensive one requiring not only the knowledge of nuclear engineering, but
also cutting-edge scientific, professional, and technical knowledge.94 The
Supreme Court thus held that the decision on whether the application
satisfied the safety standards should be left to the reasonable judgment
of the prime minister, who was supposed to hear the opinion of the AEC
and respect it in regards to safety reviews.95 As a result, the Supreme Court
held that the reviewing courts should determine whether the defendant’s
judgement was unreasonable or not, in light of the review and decision of
the AEC or its expert committee, the Nuclear Reactor Expert Review Com-
mittee (“NRERC”).96 The reviewing courts should find the granting of the
construction permit unreasonable only when the specific standards used
during the review were unreasonable in light of the current standard of
technology and science or when there was a grave error or omission in ap-
plying the specific standards to the relevant nuclear reactor during the
review and decision of AEC or NRERC.97 This is a highly deferential stance.
In an action seeking to revoke government grant of a permit, the
plaintiffs bear the burden of proof of showing that the decision to grant
88 Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Oct. 29, 1992, 1st petty bench, 46:7 SAIKÔ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHÛ [MINSHÛ], at 1174 (Japan) [hereinafter Ikata].
89 Plaintiffs Against Ikata Nuclear Power Plant, CITIZEN’S NUCLEAR INFORMATION CENTER
(CNIC) NUKE INFO TOKYO NO. 4, Mar./Apr. 1988, at 6.
90 Id.; DANIEL P. ALDRICH, SITE FIGHTS: DIVISIVE FACILITIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN JAPAN
AND THE WEST 133 (2008).
91 Matsuyama Chihô Saibansho [Matsuyama Dist. Ct.], Apr. 25, 1978, 29:4 GYÔSEI JIKEN
SAIBAN REISHÛ [GYÔSHÛ], at 588 (Japan).
92 Takamatsu Kôtô Saibansho [Takamatsu High Ct.], Dec. 14, 1984, 35:12 GYÔSEI JIKEN
SAIBAN REISHÛ [GYÔSHÛ], at 2078 (Japan).
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the permit was unreasonable.98 However, in light of the fact that all of
the evidence regarding the safety review and its processes are possessed
by the government, the Supreme Court in Ikata required the government
to prove that there were no wrong or unreasonable components to its
safety review.99 Therefore, the government must argue and adduce proof
that the specific standards used by the AEC or NRERC were not unrea-
sonable, and that no unreasonableness arose during the process of their
review, from their own decision, or within the ultimate decision of the
government.100 If the government fails to prove these matters, a pre-
sumption that the government’s judgment was practically unreasonable
will stand.101 This part of the decision was a relief to local residents.
Moreover, the entire process of constructing and operating a nu-
clear power plant requires multiple permits and approvals from the
government. The Supreme Court held the view that a permit for the
construction and operation of a nuclear reactor needed to focus on the
standards specified in the chapter on construction and operation permits
within the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act.102 Even among the various
regulations and permits necessary for the construction and operation of
nuclear reactors, there are multiple stages that have their own require-
ments, such as a permit for construction, permit for alteration, approval
of construction plans and methods, inspection before use, approval of
security protocol, regular maintenance and check-up, and so forth. Thus,
the Supreme Court held that when reviewing a construction permit, only
the fundamental design of the nuclear reactor should be subject to
review, and not the other aspects of the construction and operation of a
nuclear reactor.103 As a result, it is only the safety of the fundamental
design that should be subject to review during the safety review for a
permit to construct a nuclear reactor.
This decision showcased an attitude that was highly deferential
towards the government, forcing the courts to examine only whether the
government judgment was unreasonable or not, and not whether the
impugned nuclear reactor actually satisfied safety standards. Moreover,
by limiting the safety review to the fundamental design of the nuclear
reactor, it precluded the need to consider the overall safety of the facility,
or any other safety issues.





103 Ikata, supra note 88.
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Following the Ikata nuclear power plant case, the Supreme Court
affirmed this basic holding on standards of review in a continuation of the
Monju case, with a suit seeking a declaration of invalidity (Monju III).104
Upon remand, the Fukui District Court followed precedent and held that
it was only when there was a grave and manifest illegality that the court
could declare an order invalid.105 Then, the District Court applied the Ikata
standards of review doctrine and inquired whether there was a grave and
manifest error in the safety review.106 The Nagoya High Court, however,
held that the error did not have to be manifest for the court to declare an
order invalid, so long as the error was grave.107 Moreover, it held that the
court did not have to find a concrete risk of serious accident, but a court
needed to see whether such concrete risk could be denied.108 The High
Court then drew upon the Ikata doctrine to see whether the agency could
prove there was no grave error in the safety review.109 However, the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High Court without making
clear whether the court needed to find a grave and manifest error.110 The
major differences between the Ikata nuclear power plant case and the
Monju case involved a shuffling of responsibilities: the power to grant a
permit was vested in the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry instead
of the prime minister, the NSC took on the responsibilities previously
held by the AEC,111 and the Nuclear Reactor Safety Expert Review Com-
mittee (“NRSRC”) replaced the NRERC. But the Monju III case holding
simply followed the Ikata doctrine’s deference to the judgment of the
government.112 The major development was that the Supreme Court
found that the government could decide, while exercising reasonable judge-
ment, what matters should be considered when reviewing the safety of
a nuclear reactor’s fundamental design.113 The Supreme Court essentially
left the government with the power not only to determine whether an
104 Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], May 30, 2005, 1st petty bench, 59:4 SAIKÔ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHÛ [MINSHÛ], at 671 (Japan) [hereinafter Monju III].
105 Fukui Chihô Saibansho [Fukui Dist. Ct.], Mar. 22, 2000, Hei 1998 no. 6, 1727 HANREI
JIHÔ [HANJI], at 33 (Japan).
106 Id.
107 Nagoya Kôtô Saibansho, Kanazawa Shibu [Nagoya High Ct., Kanazawa Branch], Jan. 27,
2003, 1818 HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI], at 3 (Japan).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Monju III, supra note 104.
111 New Japanese Regulator Takes Over, supra note 28.
112 See Monju III, supra note 104.
113 Id.
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application reasonably satisfied the required safety standards, but also
the very reasonableness of the factors required as safety standards. This
allows the government to ignore many issues relevant to the safety of the
nuclear reactor, while barring the courts from reviewing these issues as
relevant if the government opts not to do so.
Earlier courts reflected this same attitude in a suit against the
grant of a permit for Reactor No. 1 of the Fukushima Daini nuclear power
plant,114 with the Supreme Court ultimately dismissing the appeal on
October 29, 1992.115 The Supreme Court narrowed the subject of safety
review to factors included in statute, excluding other factors from the safety
review, and limiting the safety review to the safety of the nuclear reactor’s
fundamental design.116 These holdings were followed by the Niigata Dis-
trict Court and the Tokyo High Court in a case involving the Kashiwazaki
Kariwa nuclear power plant operated by TEPCO.117 The Supreme Court
simply dismissed the appeal insisting on the absence of a lawful cause for
appeal, and it refused to grant a discretionary appeal as well.118
3. Legality of the Permit
Third, the courts needed to squarely face the question of whether
the permits were illegal.
In the Ikata nuclear power plant case, the plaintiffs argued that
the failure to consider issues regarding the treatment of solid waste, the
reuse of spent nuclear materials, or the impact of emissions of warmed
water made the permit unlawful, but the Supreme Court agreed with the
High Court that these issues were not relevant when conducting a safety
review for a construction permit.119 It also agreed with the High Court
that the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident did not affect
the safety review, because not all matters concerning the safety of the
114 Fukushima Chihô Saibansho [Fukushima Dist. Ct.], July 23, 1984, 35:7 GYÔSEI JIKEN
SAIBAN REISHÛ [GYÔSHÛ], at 995 (Japan); Sendai Kôtô Saibansho [Sendai High Ct.],
Mar. 20, 1990, 41:3 GYÔSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHÛ [GYÔSHÛ], at 586 (Japan).
115 Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Oct. 29, 1992, 1st petty bench, 166 SAIKÔ SAIBANSHO
SAIBANSHÛ MINJI [SAIBANSHÛ MINJI], at 509 (Japan) [hereinafter Fukushima].
116 Id.
117 See Niigata Chihô Saibansho [Niigata Dist. Ct.], Mar. 24, 1994, 45:3 GYÔSEI JIKEN
SAIBAN REISHÛ [GYÔSHÛ], at 304 (Japan); see Tokyo Kôtô Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.],
Nov. 22, 2005, 52:6 SHÔMU GEPPÔ, at 1581 (Japan).
118 Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], April 23, 2009, 1st petty bench, Hei 56 (Gozu) no. 56, TKC
database (Japan) [hereinafter Kashiwazaki Kariwa].
119 Ikata, supra note 88.
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nuclear reactor facility would be covered at the reactor installation per-
mission stage.120 Overall, the Supreme Court found that the review by
the AEC or the NRERC was not unreasonable and so the judgment of the
government to grant a permit was not unreasonable.121
In Monju III, the most significant issue was the failure to antici-
pate the possibility of the rupture of pipes and a serious accident resulting
from the leak of coolant sodium onto the floor.122 In 1995, one of the pipes
at the Monju nuclear power plant that carried the sodium coolant rup-
tured and sodium leaked from damaged pipes, reacting with oxygen in
the air to cause a fire.123 After the accident, a 0.5–1.5 mm dent was found
in the floor liner.124 An investigation revealed that the coolant could get
heated and could seep into the liner.125 If the sodium had reached the
concrete floor, then a much more serious disaster could have occurred.126
The plaintiffs argued that the failure to anticipate both the erosion of the
floor liner due to a reaction between sodium and oxygen and the prob-
lems caused by a significant increase in temperature of the floor liner were
critical errors in the safety review.127 The Nagoya High Court found that
the possibility of rupture was not considered during the safety review
and sufficient countermeasures were not adopted, and therefore con-
cluded that this error was so grave that the government permit was
invalid.128 However, the Supreme Court believed that these matters could
be considered and countermeasures could be adopted in the later stages,
and therefore it was not unreasonable for the Economy, Trade and
Industry Minister to not consider these matters during a safety review
on the fundamental design of the nuclear reactor.129 In sum, there was
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Monju III, supra note 104.
123 T. Funada & Y. Yamagishi, Sodium Leak at Monju (II): Sodium Leak, Burning and
Aerosol Behavior, in IWGFR 92, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) 284–85 (Nov. 1996),
http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/31/044/31044841.pdf?r=1
[https://perma.cc/62E9-ZASC].
124 Id. at 284. “The liner (6.1–6.2 mm, steel) was reduced in thickness by 0.5–1.5 mm.”
125 Hiroshi Seino, Shinya Miyahara, Osamu Miyake et al., Sodium Fire Tests for Inves-
tigating the Sodium Leak in Monju, in IWGFR 92, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)
298–99, 301–02 (Nov. 1996), http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Pub
lic/31/044/31044842.pdf [https://perma.cc/244D-B9AA].
126 Id. at 301–02.
127 Monju III, supra note 104.
128 Nagoya Koto Saibansho, Kanazawa Shibu [Nagoya High Ct., Kanazawa Branch],
Jan. 27, 2003, supra note 107.
129 Monju III, supra note 104.
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no illegality in the standards used, nor in their application in the safety
review, nor the grant of permit.
In the Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant case, the Supreme
Court similarly concluded that concerns over the disposal of nuclear waste,
the method of recycling and transporting spent fuel, the risk of stress cor-
rosion cracking, and other issues should not be assessed during a safety
review; thus, the court below had properly upheld a lawful granting of a
permit.130 In the Kashiwazaki Kariwa nuclear power plant case, the Tokyo
High Court rejected all of the arguments of the local residents, holding that
issues such as the environmental impact of the discharge of warmed water,
the final disposal location of solid waste, and the method of recycling and
transporting spent fuel could all be excluded from safety reviews.131 The
High Court also rejected all other arguments about the alleged failures and
errors in the safety review.132 It rejected the need to consider the JCO acci-
dent, insisting that the JCO facility was not a nuclear reactor, and that
the accident was not relevant to whether a permit should be granted.133 It
also dismissed the argument that the review failed to consider the Three
Mile Island accident, asserting that the nuclear reactor in the Three Mile
Island plant was of a different type and that the accident was caused by
human error.134 It further dismissed the argument that the review was
flawed on account of failure to consider the Chernobyl accident, insisting
again that the reactor in the Chernobyl plant was a different type, and
that the accident was caused by the absence of multilayered security
measures combined with multiple flagrant violations of safety protocols.135
The Supreme Court simply dismissed the appeal, insisting that the cited
reason for the appeal did not constitute a lawful reason for appeal, and
it similarly rejected the discretionary appeal.136
4. Due Process
In the Ikata nuclear power plant case, the local residents also chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the procedure for granting a permit, citing
the due process requirement articulated in Article 31 of the Constitution
130 Fukushima, supra note 115.





136 Kashiwazaki Kariwa, supra note 118.
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of Japan.137 Specifically, they argued that the government acted unconsti-
tutionally by failing to include local residents in the proceeding to grant
a permit, and failing to disclose relevant application documents to the
local residents.138
The Supreme Court held, however, that the due process clause
does not require the right to adequate notice and the right to make full
answer and defense in all administrative proceedings, even if the due
process clause is applicable to administrative proceedings.139 Further-
more, the Supreme Court held that, because the decision on whether the
application satisfies the requirements set forth in the Nuclear Reactor
Regulation Act requires the judgment from a highly professional and
technically capable party, the Act mandated that the opinion of the AEC,
an expert body in this field, should be heard and respected.140 In light of
this statutory scheme, the Supreme Court concluded that the absence of
an opportunity for local residents to participate in the proceeding, the
failure to disclose relevant documents, the lack of advance notice, or the
lack of opportunity for local residents to participate in permit-granting
process did not violate the “spirit” of Article 31.141
The Supreme Court confirmed these holdings in the Fukushima
Daini nuclear power plant case as well.142
C. Judicial Challenge Against Power Companies
1. Civil Injunction Suit Against the Power Companies
An opposing public can challenge a power company’s decision to
construct and operate a nuclear power plant by filing a civil suit. In the
event of an accident, affected local residents could seek damages. But in
most cases, the opposing public files suits seeking an injunction against
the construction and operation of nuclear power plants to prevent harms
and damages caused by the construction and operation of nuclear power
plants and to eliminate the risk of harms and damages that may result
from the possible serious accidents in the nuclear power plants.143
137 NIHONKOKUKENPÔ [CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN], at art. 31; Ikata, supra note 88.




142 Fukushima, supra note 115.
143 See generally Sendai Chihô Saibansho [Sendai Dist. Ct.], Jan. 31, 1994, 1482 HANREI
JIHÔ [HANJI], at 3 (Japan).
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With respect to injunction suits against power companies that
wish to construct and operate nuclear power plants, the leading case is
the Onagawa nuclear power plant case.144 Reactor No. 1 was granted a
permit in 1970 and began construction in 1979.145 In 1981, local residents
filed a civil suit seeking an injunction against further construction by
Tohoku Electric Power.146 After the facility was completed and began
operation in 1983, plaintiffs sought an injunction against the facility’s
operation instead.147 The permit for construction of Reactor No.2 was
granted in February 1989.148 Local residents also added a claim seeking
an injunction against the construction of Reactor No.2.149 Both the Sendai
District Court150 and the Sendai High Court151 dismissed the suit, and the
Supreme Court dismissed an appeal.152
In order to challenge the nuclear power plant, local residents
invoked their personality rights,153 and their right to enjoy a good envi-
ronment (environmental right)154 as a basis for injunction.155 They argued
that the nuclear power plant emitted a low level of radiation that would
increase health risks for local residents, thus infringing on the personality
144 Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Dec. 19, 2000, 3rd petty bench, Hei 1999 (e) no. 936, TKC
database (Japan) [hereinafter Onagawa].
145 See Tohoku Electric Power Onagawa Power Station No.1 Furnace, Background of the






150 Sendai Chihô Saibansho [Sendai Dist. Ct.], Jan. 31, 1994, supra note 143.
151 Sendai Kôtô Saibansho [Sendai High Ct.], Mar. 31, 1999, 1680 HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI],
at 46 (Japan).
152 Onagawa, supra note 144.
153 In Japan, it is widely believed that the right to personhood is legally protected as a
personality right under the Civil Code. This right includes physical and psychological
integrity of a person, right of reputation and privacy, and the right of autonomy. See
Matsuo Nakamura, Freedom of Economic Activities and the Right to Property, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 2; see also Naoki Kanaboshi, Competent Persons’ Constitutional Right
to Refuse Medical Treatment in the U.S. and Japan: Application to Japanese Law, 25
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 5, 50 (2006).
154 The right to enjoy one’s environment or the environmental right was first invoked in
the environmental pollution cases to justify the damage action and injunction action
against the polluters. Even if there were no personal injury or harms to the local resi-
dents, people could invoke this right when the environment was harmed or damaged. But
the courts are generally very reluctant to accept this right. See JULIAN GRESSER ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN, 146 (1981).
155 See Sendai Chihô Saibansho, [Sendai Dist. Ct.], Jan. 31, 1994, supra note 143.
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right, and that there was a concrete danger that local residents would
suffer massive, unbearable damages if a serious accident occurred due to
problems in the structure or operation of the nuclear power plant, thus
again infringing on the personality right.156 Furthermore, local residents
argued that a nuclear power plant would damage the environment and
could destroy the environment following a serious accident, infringing on
the environmental right of local residents.157 In the Onagawa nuclear
power plant case, the Sendai District Court accepted both the personality
right and the environmental right as a legal basis for an injunction.158
Turning to the burden of proof, the Sendai District Court held that
the nuclear power plant could not be totally risk-free, insisting that abso-
lute safety was impossible.159 Instead, the court held that the emission of
radioactive materials needed to be minimized as much as possible, reducing
the risk of harms to a socially negligible and tolerable degree.160 The
court then held that local residents faced the ultimate burden of proof in
determining a problem with the plant’s safety.161 However, in light of the
fact that the power company and government possessed all the data and
evidence, the Sendai District Court placed the burden on the defendant to
show, with sufficient evidence, that there was nothing wrong with the
nuclear power plant’s safety.162 If a power company failed to demonstrate
there was nothing lacking with their plant safety measures, the plaintiffs
were then required to further prove the alleged lack of plant safety.163 To
finally meet their burden, local residents had to establish that the facility
posed a concrete risk to the life and health of the local residents.164
With respect to the merit of the case, the Sendai District Court
found that the conclusion of the government safety review was reason-
able and there was nothing wrong with the impugned safety measures
included in the facility’s fundamental design.165 It also found that no
specific problems could be found in the construction and operation pro-










165 Sendai Chihô Saibansho, [Sendai Dist. Ct.], Jan. 31, 1994, supra note 143.
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accidents in other nuclear power plants.167 The Sendai District Court
concluded that there was no possibility of radiation exposure beyond a
socially negligible degree through normal operation of the facility, and
that there was no risk of a serious accident that would expose local resi-
dents to radiation levels beyond a socially negligible degree.168
This reasoning was affirmed by the Sendai High Court.169 The
Supreme Court found that the appeal did not fall within permissible legal
grounds, and it also dismissed the discretional appeal.170 Similar results
were also reached in other civil injunction cases, although all other courts
rejected the notion that environmental rights could be a legal basis for
seeking an injunction.171 This led to allowing only local residents living
close to a nuclear power plant, and therefore most likely to be hurt or to
suffer damage from a serious nuclear accident, the ability to file a civil
suit seeking an injunction. Thus, environmentalists and anti-nuclear
power activists were once again excluded from bringing suit as plaintiffs.
Apart from this issue, the Sendai District Court’s decision in the Onagawa
nuclear power plant case became the leading precedent for other civil
injunction cases against power companies.
2. Minority Position
In contrast, the Kanazawa District Court accepted the arguments
of its local residents and issued an injunction against the operation of Re-
actor No. 2 in the Shiga nuclear power plant.172 On April 14, 1999, a
permit to add Reactor No. 2 was granted, and its construction began on
August 27.173 Commercial operation was slated to start in January
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Sendai Kôtô Saibansho, [Sendai High. Ct.], Mar. 31, 1999, supra note 151.
170 Onagawa, supra note 144.
171 Kanazawa Chihô Saibansho [Kanazawa Dist. Ct.], Aug. 25, 1994, 1515 HANREI JIHÔ
[HANJI], at 3 (Japan) [hereinafter Shiga-Kanazawa]; Nagoya Kôtô Saibansho, Kanazawa
Shibu [Nagoya High Ct., Kanazawa Branch], Sept. 9, 1998, 1656 HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI],
at 37 (Japan) [hereinafter Shiga-Nagoya]; Osaka Chihô Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.],
Dec. 24, 1993, Hei 3 (wa) no. 8150, 1480 HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI], at 17 (Japan) [hereinafter
Takahama]; Sapporo Chihô Saibansho [Sapporo Dist. Ct.], Feb. 22, 1999, 1676 HANREI
JIHÔ [HANJI], at 3 (Japan) [hereinafter Tomari]; Shizuoka Chihô Saibansho [Shizuoka
Dist. Ct.], Oct. 26, 2007, TKC database (Japan) [hereinafter Hamaoka].
172 Kanazawa Chihô Saibansho [Kanazawa Dist. Ct.], Mar. 24, 2006, Hei 19 (wa) no. 430,
1930 HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI], at 25 (Japan) [hereinafter Shiga II—Kanazawa].
173 Id.
2017] T-REX, JURASSIC PARK AND NUCLEAR POWER 169
2006.174 Local residents filed a civil suit seeking an injunction against its
operation.175
Although the local residents invoked the personality right as well
as the environmental right as a basis for seeking an injunction, the court
rejected an argument based on the environmental right, holding that the
plaintiffs can seek an injunction only if they could prove that their life,
body, or health was actually injured or that there was a concrete danger
that they would be infringed.176 In civil suits, the plaintiff essentially
bears the burden of proof for the concrete danger.177 However, because all
the information and data on the safety of the nuclear facility belongs to
the defendant power company, the court held that the plaintiffs should
be required to prove only that there is a substantive concrete possibility
of radiation exposure beyond the tolerable limits by the defects in the
safety system.178 If that is established, the onus flips to the defendant
power company to establish that there is no such concrete possibility,
backed with relevant evidence.179 The defendant argued that the addition
of a second reactor was approved by the government, a fact that the court
noted was an important factor in reviewing the facility’s safety.180
However, the court also noted that unexpected, abnormal situations that
were not anticipated during the safety review have happened before, and
that the safety review for the facility was conducted seven years ago, and
held that prior approval should not preclude further review by the
courts.181
Turning to the risk of radiation exposure, the court held that the
radiation exposure from normal operation of the reactor was very low and
therefore that risk alone should not justify an injunction.182 The plaintiffs
relied on the accidents that befell the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
nuclear power plants to argue for the existence of a concrete possibility
of an accident. Yet, the court rejected their argument, insisting that the
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also rejected arguments based on accidents that happened in other nu-
clear power plants in Japan, as well as other arguments that cited
deficiencies and previous problems in the impugned nuclear reactor.184
Nevertheless, the court found that the estimates for both the
tremor speed and anticipated maximum magnitude of an earthquake
that would occur directly below a nuclear facility were too conservative,
and that the estimation formula used by the government was outdated
as it did not accurately predict the Hanshin Awaji earthquake.185 The
court also cast doubt on the reasonableness of the assumption regarding
vertical movement to be half of the horizontal movement as too formal-
istic.186 Because of these errors, the court found that the safety review was
not sufficient enough to preclude the possibility of a serious accident.187
As a result, the court was satisfied that the plaintiffs proved a substan-
tive concrete possibility of significant radiation exposure, as well as that
the defendant power company failed to rebut these arguments.188 As the
remedy, the court granted an injunction barring operation of the second
nuclear reactor.189
However, the Nagoya High Court, Kanazawa Branch reversed the
district court judgment and dismissed the suit.190 It reviewed whether
the power company had fulfilled its obligation to demonstrate, with nec-
essary evidence, that there was no safety defect.191 The Nagoya High
Court found that the power company proved that the impugned nuclear
reactor satisfied the safety standards, and therefore, it concluded that
the local residents failed to demonstrate any concrete risks.192 The Nagoya
High Court thus dismissed the injunction claim.193 Here too, the Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal for a lack of lawful cause for appeal, and
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189 Id.
190 Nagoya Kôtô Saibansho, Kanazawa Shibu [Nagoya High Ct., Kanazawa Branch], Mar. 18,




194 Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Oct. 28, 2010, 1st petty bench, Hei 21 (o) no. 1241, TKC
database (Japan).
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D. Lawsuits Against Nuclear Power and the Japanese Society
1. Reluctance of the Courts to Intervene
Japanese people are notorious for their reluctance to use litigation
to settle legal questions.195 The Japanese tend to avoid litigation and are
eager to accept settlement if litigation is filed.196 As a result, there are far
fewer regular civil cases in Japan than there are in the United States or
even in Canada.197 Therefore, it is noteworthy that the local residents
who opposed the nuclear power plants did not hesitate before filing law-
suits against the government and power companies.198 Even though the
Japanese courts are very reluctant to intervene, these residents are still
willing to file lawsuits one by one and sometimes on numerous occasions.199
There has been a consistent doubt regarding the safety of the
nuclear power plants. However, the courts have been just as consistently
reluctant to overturn decisions made by the government and nuclear
experts in the context of administrative cases concerning construction
permits and the safety of nuclear reactors. The courts are also very
reluctant to intervene or issue injunctions against power companies in
civil injunction suits. The only difference is that the courts are willing to
consider the overall safety of the nuclear power plant in civil injunction
suits, while in administrative cases the courts focus only on errors in the
195 John O. Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at Old Problems, 10 WILLAMETTE J.
INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 121, 123 (2002) (noting consensus that the resort to courts occurs
statistically less frequently in Japan compared to similar industrial societies). But see
Carl F. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant: Japan’s Changing View towards
Civil Litigation, 32:4 LAW AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 769 (2001).
196 Haley, supra note 195, at 127–28.
197 John O. Haley, Dispute Resolution in Japan: Lessons in Autonomy, 17 CAN.-U.S. L.J.
443–44 (1991). Some commentators argue that the small number of civil suits in Japan
is a result of government manipulation to deter litigation, or a rational choice by the
Japanese considering the difficulty of winning a suit and the low possibility of receiving
a sufficient remedy. See John O. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. OF
JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978); J. Mark Ramseyer, Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality
and Disputes in Japan, 14:1 J. OF JAPANESE STUD. 111 (1988). See also Tom Ginsburg &
Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of Japan’s Turn to Liti-
gation, 35 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 31 (2006). However, this argument does not explain why the
opposing residents are willing to challenge nuclear power plants despite the hurdles and
poor odds of success.
198 Haley, supra note 195, at 127–28.
199 See Robert L. Kidder & Setsuo Miyazawa, Long Term Strategies in Japanese Environ-
mental Litigation, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 608–10, 612, 614–15, 617 (1993) (positing that
local residents may continuously file lawsuits in order to facilitate a social movement).
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safety review on the fundamental design of the facility. It is also note-
worthy that the courts in civil litigation do not preclude judicial review
on safety even though the nuclear reactor received approval and a permit
from the government. Furthermore, while the courts place the ultimate
burden of proof on the plaintiff local residents, the courts require that the
defendant power companies first prove that there was no safety defect.
Nevertheless, the courts found that the nuclear power plant satisfied the
safety standards established by the government, holding that there was
no safety defect, deferring to the judgment of the government, and dis-
missed injunction claims in almost all cases. In this regard, these courts
are following the holding in the Ikata nuclear power plant case for civil
injunction suits as well.
2. Reluctance Reconsidered
The deferential attitude of the Japanese courts towards the gov-
ernment in administrative permit revocation and declaration of invalidity
cases may come across as unsurprising. Generally, Japanese courts take
a highly deferential attitude towards the government in administrative
cases.200 Lawsuits filed by the public against administrative orders are
dismissed or rejected in most cases.201 This judicial deference is not limited
to lawsuits against a permit for the construction of a nuclear reactor; it
is present in all sorts of administrative cases, which has led courts to
typically reject such claims unless they are satisfied there has been a
blatant violation of the law, a clear error in an application of law, or a
clear abuse of discretion by the administrative agencies.202
The highly deferential attitude within civil lawsuits against nu-
clear power plants is remarkable, however, because the Japanese courts
generally impose a much higher duty of diligence on chemical or pharma-
ceutical companies that produce and distribute chemical products or
medicine.203 These companies are held to a much higher standard of care
since they produce products that are not only highly dangerous for local
200 See Nihon bengoshi rengôkai [Japan Federation of Bar Associations], Gyoseisoshou
kentôkai eno iken [Comments for Administrative Litigation Review Committee], at 4–6,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/gyouseisosyou/dai4/4siryou2.pdf.
201 The Japan Federation of Bar Associations (“JFBA”) estimates that the citizen plaintiffs
could win (even partially) only in 10–15% of all administrative cases. Id. at 2.
202 Id. at 3.
203 Tomohei Taniguchi, A Commentary on the Legal Theory of the Four Major Pollution
Cases, 9 LAW IN JAPAN 36–38 (1976).
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residents, but can also seriously harm the health of customers.204 Even
when the manufacturing process satisfies government regulations, the
company is not shielded against liability.205 Even if there is no solid sci-
entific proof supporting a causality between a defendant’s conduct and
a plaintiff’s damage, the courts are willing to hold a defendant liable if
there is reasonable proof of the relationship.206 Although these holdings
are mostly concerned with actions for damages, and not injunctive suits,
the vast difference in the judiciary’s stringent attitude towards chemical
and pharmaceutical companies, compared to the highly deferential attitude
in lawsuits against power companies, is striking.207
III. FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AND ITS LESSONS
A. Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Everything changed on March 11, 2011.208
204 Kumamoto Chihô Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.], Mar. 20, 1973, Showa 44 (Wa) no.
522, 696 HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI], at 15 (Japan) (holding Nihon Chisso liable for Minamata
disease); Osaka Chihô Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.], June 21, 2006, 1942 HANREI JIHÔ
[HANJI], at 23 (Japan) (HIV contamination case); Fukuoka Chihô Saibansho [Fukuoka
Dist. Ct.], August 30, 2006, 1953 HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI], at 11 (Japan) (HIV contamination
case); Tokyo Chihô Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], Mar. 23, 2007, 1975 HANREI JIHÔ
[HANJI], at 1 (Japan) (HIV contamination case).
205 Kumamoto Chihô Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.], Mar. 20, 1973, supra note 204.
206 Id. See also Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], June 16, 2006, 2nd petty bench, Hei 16 (Receiv-
ing) no. 672, 60:5 SAIKÔ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÛ [MINSHÛ], at 1997 (Japan).
207 See Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], June 16, 2006, supra note 206.
208 The following description of the Fukushima nuclear accident is based on the following
sources: see generally INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR
ACCIDENT, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima [https://perma.cc/5BL8
-P2SS]; INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC AGENCY, THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT: REPORT BY
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL (2015), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub
1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5T6-NZ52] [hereinafter IAEA FUKU-
SHIMA REPORT]; WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT, http://www.world
-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-ac
cident.aspx [https://perma.cc/7EL9-XVZW]; NATIONAL DIET OF JAPAN, OFFICIAL REPORT
OF THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2012), https://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/89W3-354G]; INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON THE ACCIDENT AT THE FUKUSHIMA
NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS OF TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, FINAL REPORT (2012),
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/final-report.html [https://perma.cc/BKC3-U2HJ];
TEPCO, FUKUSHIMA GENSHIRYOKU JIKO CHOUSA HOUKOKUSHO [FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT] (2012), http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/betu12_j
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The 9.0-magnitude Tohoku Earthquake occurred 130 km off the
shore of Sendai at 2:46 PM on March 11, 2011, causing nuclear reactors
No. 1 to No. 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant209 operated
by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (“TEPCO”) to initiate an automatic
shutdown, a procedure known as a scram.210 A fourth reactor was shut
down for regular maintenance and its nuclear fuel was stored inside the
cooling pool.211 Despite the lack of evidence suggesting any serious
structural damage to the facility, the earthquake knocked out the power
lines that supplied the electricity to the Fukushima nuclear power plant,
disrupting the facility’s supply of external electricity.212 Fortunately, the
back-up generators immediately kicked in and supplied power to the
power plant.213 However, the earthquake created an extremely powerful
tsunami that overpowered the tsunami barriers (seawalls) that were sup-
posed to shield the Fukushima nuclear power plant.214 While the earth-
quake did minimal damage to the roads at the power station (apart from
damage to some of the routes), the tsunami carried objects and debris that
left no access to the incoming roads to the plant, preventing anyone from
reaching the plant with automobiles.215 The tsunami water entered the
power plant, damaging the seawater pumps and disabling the residual heat
removal (“RHR”) cooling system.216 It also submerged the diesel gener-
ators and the batteries, which were all located in the basements of the
/images/120620j0303.pdf [https://perma.cc/33YA-9745] [hereinafter TEPCO REPORT];




209 The Fukushima Daiichi reactors are General Electric (“GE”) boiling water reactors
(“BWR”) of an early (1960s) design supplied by GE, Toshiba and Hitachi, with what is
known as a Mark I containment. There were six reactors inside the Daiichi plant and the
No. 5 and No. 6 reactors were located separately from the rest. Reactors one, two, and
three came into commercial operation between 1971 and 1975. See TEPCO, FUKUSHIMA
NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS REPORT, supra note 208, at 1.
210 IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 23–24; TEPCO REPORT, supra note 208,
at i, 36, 70, 113.
211 IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 23–24.
212 Id. at 24–25.
213 Id. at 24.
214 Id. at 30–31.
215 TEPCO, FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS REPORT , supra note 208, at 146–47,
177; IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 87.
216 TEPCO, FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS REPORT , supra note 208, at 156–57,
264, 266; IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 31, 33.
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turbine buildings.217 Thus, the back-up generators were rendered useless
and the power plant lost all power at 3:42 PM.218
Even when the fission reactions were shut down, the reactor cores
continued to produce some heat.219 Without heat removal via a heat ex-
changer connected to outside the facility, the reactor cores increased in
temperature, evaporating the surrounding water and, once there was no
more water left to evaporate, the cores began to melt down.220 To cool
down the nuclear fuel, plant workers tried to do everything they could do.
The nuclear power plant emergency response centre team (“on-site ERC”)
and its support unsuccessfully tried to reconnect power lines, to bring in
power generators from outside despite the damage to incoming roads,
and to power the facility through the use of generator trucks because of
the incompatibility of plugs.221 They also tried to cool down the reactor
cores as well as the spent fuels stored in the fourth reactor by supplying
water from outside.222 The workers even resorted to seawater to cool the
reactors, knowing that the use of seawater would ruin the system.223
Meanwhile, the overheated nuclear rods created excess hydrogen
gas, which created a high-pressure system inside Reactor No. 1.224 As
pressure rose in Reactor No. 1, plant workers attempted to vent the con-
tainment to decrease the pressure.225 But in the absence of power, such
a task needed to be done manually, delaying the whole process.226 Even
though they finally accomplished manually venting the unit, at 3:36 PM
on Saturday, March 12, there was a hydrogen explosion on the service
floor of the building above Reactor No. 1 containment, blowing off the
roof and cladding on the top part of the building.227 The cooling system
for Reactor No. 2 failed two days later on Monday, March 14, eventually
depleting the water surrounding the nuclear rods that subsequently
melted down.228 Then, early on Tuesday, March 15, the pressure sup-
pression chamber under the reactor seemed to have ruptured possibly
217 IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 31–32.
218 Id. at 76–78.
219 Id. at 33–35.
220 Id. at 26, 36–37, 55–56.
221 Id. at 77, 79.
222 IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 44.
223 Id. at 37.
224 Id. at 33, 59.
225 Id. at 35.
226 Id. at 37.
227 IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 38.
228 Id. at 42, 57–58.
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due to a hydrogen explosion, causing the containment pressure inside to
drastically drop.229 In Reactor No. 3, the cooling system failed on Saturday,
March 12, and early on Sunday, March 13 as the reactor’s water levels
dropped dramatically.230 A very large hydrogen explosion above Reactor
No. 3 containment destroyed most of the roof and walls while demolish-
ing the top part of the building.231 The explosion created a huge number
of highly radioactive debris scattered around the ground near Reactor
No. 3, making it hard for plant workers to approach to the facility.232 The
explosion also released highly contaminated radioactive materials into
the air, significantly increasing the radiation level of the plant and seri-
ously contaminating the environment.233
Reactor No. 4 was already shut down for regular maintenance when
the earthquake hit.234 However, used nuclear fuel needs to be cooled over
a long time.235 This is supposed to be accomplished by submerging the
fuel in a pool of water, located above each reactor which is near the top
of the reactor building.236 The pool also contains unspent fuel in addition
to spent fuel.237 At the time of the accident, in addition to a large number
of spent fuel assemblies, the Reactor No. 4's pool also held a full core load
of 548 unspent fuel assemblies.238 Without power, the plant lost its
capacity to cool the unspent fuel assemblies through circulated water.239
At about 6 AM on Tuesday, March 15, an explosion and fire occurred in
Reactor No. 4,240 caused by hydrogen vented from Reactor No. 3 which
reached Reactor No. 4 through backflow in shared ducts.241
Indeed, it took a tremendous effort from the plant workers to pour
water, especially seawater, into the reactor facilities to supply water to the
cooling pools and cool down the damaged reactor.242 Eventually, the power
229 Id. at 43.
230 Id. at 37, 39–40.
231 Id. at 42, 58. This took place at 11:01 AM on March 14, 2011.
232 IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 41, 58.
233 Id. at 1.
234 Id. at 58.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 26, 153.
237 IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 27.
238 Id. at 58; David Wright, More on Spent Fuel Pools at Fukushima, UNION OF CON-
CERNED SCIENTISTS: ALL THINGS NUCLEAR (Mar. 21, 2011, 4:32 PM), http://allthingsnu
clear.org/dwright/more-on-spent-fuel-pools-at-fukushima [https://perma.cc/22YY-KPLU].
239 IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 27.
240 Id. at 43–44.
241 Id. at 58.
242 Id. at 79.
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lines were reconnected and the Fukushima power plant received power
once again.243 The power plant was able to cool down any overheated
reactor fuel as well as spent fuel in the cooling pool.244 All that remained
was to repair the damaged facilities and ultimately to dispose of the entire
nuclear facility. The plant reached a cold shut down in December 2011.245
B. What Went Wrong?
It is not difficult to speculate on what went wrong during the
Fukushima nuclear accident.
First of all, the government, TEPCO, and the scientific commu-
nity did not anticipate that such a powerful earthquake would occur so
close to Japan.246 In retrospect, there was evidence that indicated a very
powerful earthquake had previously hit this region and that an extremely
powerful tsunami struck the Sanriku Coast a long time ago.247 However,
scientists could not figure out precisely how powerful the previous earth-
quake was.248 A few researchers did warn about the risk of a much more
powerful earthquake than the one anticipated by the government and
TEPCO, but the government, TEPCO, and most other nuclear scientists
dismissed these warnings as simply unrealistic.249
243 Id. at 44, 47.
244 IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 47.
245 Id. at 19 n.24.
246 The Japanese government and TEPCO anticipated the maximum strength of any
possible earthquake to be at magnitude 7.9, and anticipated that a tsunami would be
fended off by the tsunami barrier with a height of 3.1 m. TEPCO built seawater intake
buildings at four meters above sea level, and the main plant buildings at the top of a
slope ten meters above sea level, so that it could escape any tsunami damages. Thereafter,
more recent research indicated the possibility of a much higher tsunami and TEPCO in-
creased the height of the seawall to 5.7 m. The Tohoku Earthquake had a magnitude of
9.0 and it caused a tsunami with height of 14 to 15 m. See James M. Acton & Mark Hibbs,
Why Fukushima Was Preventable, CARNEGIE PAPERS (March 2012), at 9–11, http://carne
gieendowment.org/2012/03/06/why-fukushima-was-preventabale-pub-47361 [https://perma
.cc/KJ97-5XRN]; IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 51.
247 Acton & Hibbs, supra note 246, at 12.
248 CHUO BOSAI KAIGI [CENTRAL DISASTER PREVENTION CONFERENCE], TOHOKUCHIHÔ
TAIHEIYÔ OKI JISHIN WO KYOUKUNTOSHITA JISHIN TSUNAMI TAISAKU NI KANSURU SENMON-
CHOUSAKAI HOUKOKU [REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST
EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI IN LIGHT OF THE TOHOKU REGION OFF THE PACIFIC COAST
EARTHQUAKE] 7 (Sep. 28, 2011), http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/chousakai/tohokukyo
kun/pdf/houkoku.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS5A-GTVJ] (a very powerful earthquake from the
869 AD was ignored because past analysis was focused on recurrent powerful earthquakes).
249 CHUO BOSAI KAIGI [CENTRAL DISASTER PREVENTION CONFERENCE], supra note 248; see
also Acton & Hibbs, supra note 246, at 11–12.
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The government as well as TEPCO failed to pay sufficient atten-
tion to risks associated with a powerful tsunami and thus failed to secure
the safety of the Fukushima nuclear power plant against a powerful tsu-
nami.250 TEPCO and the government thus failed to use the more recent
and reliable prediction methodology for damage caused by tsunamis,
especially for the possible damage caused by the run-up on the slope.251
As a result, the seawater pump and heat exchanger were destroyed by
the tsunami without any alternative.252 It was also a fatal error to place
the back-up generators in the basement of the facility.253 Indeed, the gov-
ernment and TEPCO failed to adopt comprehensive anti-flooding mea-
sures.254 Once swept by the tsunami, these back-up generators became
completely useless.
Second, the government and TEPCO never prepared for the pos-
sibility of an extended total power outage.255 As a result, when the power
plant lost all power, the plant also lost all the measures to cool down the
reactor fuel rods, thus leading to nuclear meltdown and explosions. It
was a grave error for the government and for TEPCO to not have additional
measures in anticipation of the facility’s total power loss.
Moreover, there were ample opportunities to notice the need to
prepare for a total power loss. After the 9/11 attacks in the United States,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”), a regulatory body on nu-
clear power in the United States, mandated all US power companies to
prepare for total power loss.256 The Japanese government knew about
this development, but was not able to notify TEPCO per NRC order.257
250 Acton & Hibbs, supra note 246, at 13, 26.
251 Id. at 12–13, 23–24.
252 Id. at 21–22.
253 Peter Fairley, What We Learned About Nuclear Safety from Fukushima, TECHNOLOGY
REVIEW (Mar. 2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/427166/what-we-learned-about
-nuclear-safety-from-fukushima/ [https://perma.cc/8TZR-W7M6] (citing the comment made
by Tony Irwin, a lecturer in nuclear technology from Australian National University).
254 Acton & Hibbs, supra note 246, at 22–23, 26. In addition to building much higher sea-
walls, the government could have demanded facilities to, for example, relocate emergency
diesel generators and other emergency power sources to higher ground, establish watertight
connections between emergency power supplies and the plant, or install emergency power
equipment and cooling pumps in dedicated, bunkered, watertight buildings or compartments.
255 See id. at 19.
256 NRC, REPORT: A COMPARISON OF U.S. AND JAPANESE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS IN
EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT 15 (Nov. 2013), http://www.nrc.gov
/docs/ML1332/ML13326A991.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3W8-UMS5] [hereinafter NRC COM-
PARISON REPORT].
257 Minoru Matsutani, NRC briefed NISA on contingencies; Tepco in dark, THE JAPAN
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2012), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/01/28/national/nrc-briefed
2017] T-REX, JURASSIC PARK AND NUCLEAR POWER 179
Therefore, TEPCO did not take any additional measures and the gov-
ernment also did not require any additional measures to be taken.258
Third, TEPCO did not sufficiently prepare for emergencies. As the
pressure inside the nuclear vessel increased, there was a need to vent
and release the pressure. Without any power, pressure needed to be
released manually. It seems, however, that no one confidently knew
where the switches to manually control the vents were located, and no
one was ever trained to manually vent the nuclear vessel. Plant workers
needed to confirm the place of vent switches and the method of
operation.259 Moreover, because the rising radiation level, they had to
come up with the idea of figuring out how to open the vent both manually
and quickly with heavy protective gear.260 Similarly, although there was
a need to supply water from outside, there was insufficient preparation
for such a task.261 As a result, the government had to call for help from
firefighters from other local governments to supply water into the reactor
facilities.262
Apparently, absence of sufficient countermeasures against the
earthquake and tsunami and utter unpreparedness derived from the
overconfidence in technology, a “safety myth” prevailed in Japan that a
serious accident would never happen.263 Instead of talking about the pos-
sible risks and how to cope with the possible damages or to reduce the
possible damages, all the government, power companies, and nuclear scien-
tists had presumed that the nuclear power plant was safe. As a result,
even a discussion about the risk or necessity of additional safety measures
or preparation was likely to be avoided.264 Moreover, even when the new
safety measures were introduced, there was no back-checking obligation—
the obligation to make sure the nuclear reactors that received permits
complied with the new additional safety measures.265 Such a measure
would have raised the suspicion that existing facilities that do not comply
-nisa-on-contingencies-tepco-in-dark/#.Wdf3SvlSyUk [https://perma.cc/7NUP-SYJY]; see
TEPCO, FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS REPORT (2012), supra note 208, at 54.
258 Acton & Hibbs, supra note 246, at 19–20.
259 TEPCO REPORT, supra note 208, at 150.
260 Id. at 151.
261 Id. at 140–41, noting that most of the fire trucks stationed inside the plant were de-
stroyed by the tsunami or disabled, and the plant workers needed to remove all the tsunami
debris to look for an intake bulb for outside water.
262 IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT, supra note 208, at 79.
263 Acton & Hibbs, supra note 246, at 2.
264 Id. at 27–28.
265 Id. at 14.
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with the additional safety measures were not safe. The government and
power companies apparently did not want such suspicion.
Fourth, the government was also apparently totally unprepared
for such an emergency. The Democratic Party of Japan (“DPJ”), which
took over the government in 2009 for the first time, was apparently un-
prepared for managing the government. When the situation deteriorated
so quickly, the plant, TEPCO, and the government under the DPJ Prime
Minister Naoto Kan could not respond to rising urgency quickly and ef-
ficiently enough. The information on the plant was sent to TEPCO head-
quarters, and then to NISA, METI, and then to the prime minister.266
The prime minister and the government leaders were frustrated with the
delay and insufficiency of the information they received.267 They suspected
that TEPCO might be hiding more damaging information.268 Apparently,
there was no effective information sharing among participants. Moreover,
the decision-making process was chaotic. After the nuclear emergency was
issued by the prime minister269 and the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures
Headquarters was established in the Cabinet office,270 it was the prime
minister who was supposed to coordinate all emergency measures as a
director of the headquarters.271 But the prime minister did not have legal
authority to order or direct TEPCO, the plant manager, or issue an evac-
uation order.272 Moreover, the prime minister did not have experts for
giving advice on countermeasures on this kind of serious accident in the
nuclear power plant. Nevertheless, he tried to micromanage the whole
operation to counteract against the emergency.273 There was indeed
266 Jeff Kingston, Mismanaging Risk and the Fukushima Nuclear Crisis, 10(12:4) THE
ASIA PACIFIC JOURNAL 1, 8 (2012).
267 Id.
268 Id. at 1.
269 Genshiryoku saigai taisaku tokubetsu sochihô [Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Basic
Act], Law No. 156 of 1999, [hereinafter Nuclear Disaster Act], art. 5, para. 2 (Japan).
270 Id. at art. 16, para. 1.
271 Id. at art. 15, para. 3.
272 It was the municipal mayor who could legally restrict the entry into an area or order
evacuation. Saigai taisaku kihonhô [Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act], Law No. 223
of 1961, at art 63, para. 1. It was also the Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry who
had the power to order the power company to suspend the operation, alter, repair, or
relocate the nuclear reactor. The prime minister could only direct these mayors or the
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry. Id. at art. 20, para. 2. After the 2012 amend-
ment, it is now the NRA, which has the power to order the power company to take specific
countermeasures, and the NRA’s independence is statutorily guaranteed. Genshiryoku
kisei iinkai secchihô [Act to Establish Nuclear Regulatory Authority], Law No. 47 of 2012
[hereinafter NRA Act], at art. 5; Nuclear Disaster Act, supra note 269, at art. 20, para. 3.
273 Lessons in Leadership from the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
2017] T-REX, JURASSIC PARK AND NUCLEAR POWER 181
confusion on who should have had ultimate responsibility for solving all
the critical questions.274
Finally, nuclear experts did not know how to respond to this nuclear
crisis. They didn’t expect that the nuclear reactors would explode with a
hydrogen blast.275 They were at a loss about how to address the total loss
of power and inability to cool down nuclear reactor fuels.276 They had not
prepared any countermeasures against these situations and could not
come up with appropriate countermeasures in time.277 They needed to
improvise almost everything in response to emergent contingencies.278
C. Lessons of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
The Fukushima nuclear accident left many lessons for future nu-
clear power policy. First of all, it made clear that there is surely a grave
risk that serious accidents could happen and serious damages could be
inflicted. Because of the accident, many local residents were forced to
5–6, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/lessons-leadership-fukushima-nuclear
-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/8HNT-5WN9].
274 After the plant manager started preparation of seawater to cool down Reactor No. 1,
the prime minister hesitated to approve this decision fearing that the use of seawater
might exacerbate the situation. Sensing the hesitation of the prime minister, TEPCO
ordered the plant manager to wait for the prime minister’s decision. However, the plant
manager ignored this order and went on to pour seawater into the reactor and probably
saved Japan from much a greater disaster. TEPCO REPORT, supra note 208, at 148.
275 Haruki Madarame, a chairperson of NSC, replied to Prime Minister Kan’s inquiry as
to the possibility of a hydrogen blast on their way to the Fukushima plant by helicopter
that there would be no explosion, only to see the hydrogen blast several hours later. Kantei
no kainyu tsuyometa Madarame hatsugen “Suiso bakuhatsu nai” [Madarame’s “no hydrogen
blast” reply lead to much intrusive government intervention] NIKKEI 1 (February 27, 2012),
http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASDG2704H_X20C12A2CC1000/ [https://perma.cc
/KBB3-8ZNV]. NSC was supposed to give advice on the safety issues of the nuclear power
reactors. However, not all members could gather together and, because the chairperson
is always with the prime minister, it could not function as an advisory group.
276 Eiichi Yamaguchi, Meltdown wo husegenakatta honto no riyu [True reason why the
nuclear meltdown was not prevented], NIKKEI TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 15, 2011) http://techon
.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/COLUMN/20111215/202630/?rt=nocnt [https://perma.cc/FH63-GG7N]
(even after the total power loss, TEPCO could have prevented the meltdown by pouring
seawater immediately).
277 Fukushima report: Key points in nuclear disaster report, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18718486 [https://perma.cc/5FKT-XUTG] (“The
government, the regulators, TEPCO management, and the Kantei [prime minister’s office]
lacked the preparation and the mindset to efficiently operate an emergency response to
an accident of this scope. None, therefore, were effective in preventing or limiting the
consequential damage”).
278 Kingston, supra note 266, at 6.
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evacuate, with some still unable to return.279 The radiation also seriously
affected the agricultural products produced in the nearby communities
and the fish caught in the nearby sea.280 Many nearby communities are
so badly contaminated that despite decontamination efforts, large areas
surrounding the power plant are still contaminated.281 Even though some
of the residents can return, they are forced to live in constant fear of the
potential effects of radiation contamination.282 TEPCO was forced to pay
huge amounts of damages to victims of the accident, and it is difficult to
predict how much it will have to pay in the future.283
Second, the Fukushima nuclear accident revealed that the safety
of nuclear power was simply a “myth.” Despite all assurances that nuclear
power plants were safe, it became apparent that there is always a risk
of a serious accident. A serious accident could happen and grave damage
could be caused. The belief that there would be no serious accidents was
merely a result of overconfidence in technology.284
But most importantly, the Fukushima nuclear accident revealed
that we cannot blindly trust the government and experts. It vividly re-
vealed that the government regulator of nuclear power before the
Fukushima accident, NISA, an external agency of ANRE, inside METI,
was actually captured by the power companies and acted as a promoter
279 In total, approximately 154,000 people have been evacuated from Fukushima. RECON-
STRUCTION AGENCY, THE STATUS OF FUKUSHIMA 1, http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/en
glish/topics/2013/03/the-status-in-fukushima.html [https://perma.cc/VNY5-FDYX].
280 Tomoko Nakanishi & Keitaro Tanoi (eds.), AGRICULTURAL IMPLICATION OF THE FUKU-
SHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT (Springer 2016).
281 David McNeill & Miguel Quintana, Fukushima residents question radiation cleanup
effort, CBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/fukushima-residents
-question-radiation-cleanup-effort-1.1856332.
282 Fred Pears, In Fukushima, A Bitter Legacy Of Radiation, Trauma and Fear, YALE EN-
VIRONMENT 360 (Sept. 19, 2016), http://e360.yale.edu/features/fukushima_bitter_legacy
_of_radiation_trauma_fear [https://perma.cc/BM8U-ZTRL].
283 The government now estimates that TEPCO will need to pay over 8 trillion JPY (roughly
70 billion USD under the current exchange rate) as compensation for nuclear damage
and decontamination. Touden eno baisho shien 8chouen wo toppa, genbaikikin ni 7sen-
okuen wo tsuikashinsei 1 SANKEI SHIMBUN (Dec. 27, 2016), http://www.sankei.com/econ
omy/news/161227/ecn1612270019-n1.html [https://perma.cc/5LMY-TCQH]. The total cost
of the Fukushima accident is now believed to exceed 20 trillion JPY (roughly 180 billion
USD under the current exchange rate). Cost of Fukushima disaster expected to soar to
¥20 trillion, 1 JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016
/11/28/national/cost-fukushima-disaster-expected-soar-¥20-trillion/#.WFbUXbESjGY
[https://perma.cc/2RCY-EQJC].
284 Akira Omoto, The accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: What
Went Wrong and What Lessons Are Universal?, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS AND METHODS IN
PHYSICS RESEARCH A 731 (2013) 3, 6.
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of nuclear power rather than a regulator.285 As a result, the government
was more concerned with the promotion of nuclear power than with the
safety of local residents.
Surely, the Japanese government and the Japanese people learned
very important lessons from the Fukushima accident. The government
created a separate safety regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Au-
thority (“NRA”), which is under the direct control of the Ministry of the
Environment, not METI.286 METI no longer functions as a promoter and
regulator of nuclear power. The Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act was
revised to require more stringent requirements for nuclear safety287 and
NRA also adopted newly revamped safety standards for all nuclear power
plants.288 In particular, a nuclear power plant is mandated to update its
facility to satisfy new evolving standards.289 Moreover, preparations for
the event of a total power loss are now mandatory.290 Because the new
guidelines adopted the basic forty-year life rule for nuclear reactors,291
and extensions are granted only in exceptional cases, power companies
are practically forced to give up on reactivating older nuclear reactors
because of the cost associated with upgrading them to meet the new
requirements.292 The new standards were also designed to ensure that
nuclear power plants could withstand more powerful earthquakes and
were better prepared for much taller tsunamis by mandating the facility
install much higher tsunami barriers.293
285 Acton & Hibbs, supra note 246, at 24–26; Charles D. Ferguson & Mark Jansson, Regu-
lating Japanese Nuclear Power in the Wake of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, FAS 5–7
(May 2013), https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Regulating_Japanese_Nuclear
_13May131.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL3H-UC22].
286 NRA Act, supra note 272.
287 Id.
288 See generally NUCLEAR REGULATORY AUTHORITY (NRA), OUTLINE OF THE DRAFT NEW
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL FACILITIES, RESEARCH REACTORS, AND
NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE/DISPOSAL FACILITIES, https://www.nsr.go.jp/english/regulatory/
[https://perma.cc/W973-ZU85].
289 See Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act, supra note 24.
290 NRA, OVERVIEW DRAFT NEW SAFETY STANDARDS FOR NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS NRA,
JAPAN 2 (January 2013), https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000067120.pdf [https://perma.cc
/Z289-XKAK].
291 NRA, ENFORCEMENT OF THE NEW REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMERCIAL NU-
CLEAR POWER REACTORS 1 (July 8, 2013), https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000067212.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3HUV-S28U].
292 Id. at 9–11.
293 Id. Moreover, the new standards explicitly banned the construction of the nuclear power
plant right above the active faults, and mandated consideration of the faults with signs
of movement in the past 120,000 to 130,000 years, also obligating the power company to
check any sign of movement between 130,000 and 400,000 years ago if there was some doubt.
184 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 42:145
This is a significant improvement, although it might be still ques-
tioned whether, compared with the government regulation on nuclear
power in the United States, Japanese regulations are sufficient.294 But
what about the judicial response? Has there been any change in the judi-
cial attitude towards nuclear power plants?
IV. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER AFTER FUKUSHIMA
A. After the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
After the earthquake, all active nuclear reactors in Japan were
automatically shut down. Subsequently, there were no active nuclear
power plants operating after the Fukushima accident.295 In order to re-
sume operations at a nuclear power plant, a power company needed to
clear the revised safety standards established by NRA and needed to
have consent from local governments.296 It took a while for NRA to come
up with the new safety standards and it was also not easy for the power
companies to obtain the necessary consent from local governments because
an increased number of local residents came to show serious concern over
the safety of nuclear power plants.297
294 NRC COMPARISON REPORT, supra note 256. It might be possible to find, however, the
same kind of problems in the United States. Neal H. Lewis, Interpreting the Oracle:
Licensing Modifications, Economics, Safety, Politics, and the Future of Nuclear Power in
the United States, 16 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 27 (2006); see generally Richard Webster
with Julia LeMense, Spotlight on Safety at Nuclear Power Plants: The View from Oyster
Creek, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 365 (2009). After the Fukushima accident, the NRC
conducted a critical review of its regulation system and concluded that additional
measures were required. NRC, WHAT ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM FUKUSHIMA? 1
(Jul. 28, 2017), https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard
/priorities.html [https://perma.cc/9AWH-JX9K]; see generally NRC, RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Jul. 12, 2011), https://www.nrc
.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TCF-X8GB]; see also Daniel A.
Dorfman, The Changing Perspectives of U.S. and Japanese Nuclear Energy Policies in the
Aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi Disaster, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 255, 255 (2012); see
generally Emily Hammond, Nuclear Power, Risk, and Retroactivity, 48 VANDERBILT J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1059 (2015).
295 David Batty, Japan shuts down last working nuclear reactor, THE GUARDIAN, May 5,
2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/05/japan-shuts-down-last-nuclear
-reactor [https://perma.cc/J83D-D85Q].
296 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FIVE AND A HALF YEARS AFTER FUKUSHIMA,
3 OF JAPAN’S 54 NUCLEAR REACTORS ARE OPERATING (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.eia.gov
/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27912 [https://perma.cc/A7LB-UVKN].
297 Id.
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Moreover, the LDP, which had been a major proponent of nuclear
power before the Fukushima accident, lost an election in 2009 to its rival
party, the DPJ, which was reluctant to resume the operation of nuclear
power plants after the Fukushima accident. DPJ Prime Minister Naoto
Kan once expressed his personal view that Japan was better off abandon-
ing all nuclear power.298 Nevertheless, power companies, nuclear scientists,
and all others who have a vested interest in nuclear power did not give
up.299 During the 2012 election campaign, DPJ came to adopt the anti-
nuclear power policy.300 Many other minority parties also opposed the
nuclear power. LDP, on the other hand, was ambivalent301 but everyone
knew that LDP would want to reactivate the nuclear reactors. With a
landslide victory of LDP over DPJ in the post-Fukushima election in 2012,
it was again LDP that controlled the government.302 And the LDP gov-
ernment came to officially accept nuclear power303 and allowed power
companies to restart their reactors. As of July 2017, power companies
have applied for permission to reactivate a total of twenty six nuclear
reactors, with five reactors already reactivated and seven others already
approved.304 Kansai Electric Power applied for a permit for the restart of
nuclear reactors No. 3 and No. 4 of the Ooi nuclear power plant, which
finally resumed operations on July 5, 2012 and July 21, 2012, respec-
tively.305 It became the first nuclear power plant to resume operations
298 Prime Minister’s Office, Press Interview of Prime Minister Kan (July 13, 2011), http://
www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201107/13kaiken.html.
299 Ellis S. Krauss & Robert J. Pekkanen, The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Liberal Democratic
Party, 69 JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES 1 (2010).
300 Minshuto (DPJ), Manifesto 2012, 2, 6, https://www.dpj.or.jp/global/downloads/mani
festo2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/N68B-3JUW].
301 Jiminto (LDP), Manifesto 2012, 6 http://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/j_file2012.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3YRE-RFA7].
302 Martin Fackler, Japan Election Returns Power to Old Guard, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/world/asia/conservative-liberal-democratic
-party-nearing-a-return-to-power-in-japan.html?mcubz=1.
303 The government now estimates that the nuclear power will constitute 20–22% of all
power in 2030. SHIGEN ENERGY CHÔ [AGENCY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY],
CHOUKI ENERGY JUKYU MITOOSHI [LONG TERM ESTIMATION OF ENERGY PRODUCTION] 7
(July 2015), http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2015/07/20150716004/20150716004_2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2SJK-GBRD].
304 DENKI JIGYÔ RENGÔKAI [FEDERATION OF ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES OF JAPAN],
KOKUNAI NO GENSHIRYOKU HATSUDUDENSHO NO SAIKADOU NIMUKETA TAIOUJOUKYOU
[CURRENT SITUATION OF REACTIVATION OF THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS],
http://www.fepc.or.jp/theme/re-operation/ [https://perma.cc/APN5-UPEU].
305 Ohi reactors cleared for restart, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (June 18, 2012), http://www
.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Ohi_reactors_cleared_for_restart-1806124.html [https://perma
.cc/277G-3RFY].
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after the Fukushima accident.306 After stopping for regular maintenance,
they were again granted an approval under the new safety standards on
February 22, 2017.307 Owned by Kyushu Electric Power, reactors No. 1 and
No. 2 of the Sendai nuclear power plant were reactivated on November 13,
2015, and reactor No. 3 of the Ikata nuclear power plant operated by
Shikoku Electric Power was reactivated on August 12, 2016.308 And as we
will see below, the No. 3 and No. 4 reactors of the Takahama nuclear power
plant operated by Kansai Electric Power were approved and reactivated
on January 29 and February 16, 2016 as well.309 In addition, Reactor No.
3 of the Mihama nuclear power plant310 and No. 1 and No. 2 reactors of the
Takahama nuclear power plant operated by Kansai Electric Power, as well
as No. 3 and No. 4 reactors of the Genkai nuclear power plant operated
by Kyushu Electric Power, are approved and are slated to reactivation.311
There were some lawsuits against nuclear power plants that were
already pending at the time of the Fukushima accident.312 Some cases
had already been decided by lower courts, and were now before the ap-
pellate courts.313 Opposing residents were waiting for the appellate court
to review their case or issue a judgement.314 Naturally, opposing local
residents incorporated the lessons from the Fukushima accident into
their argument.315
Moreover, opposing residents filed a suit that sought to prevent
the restart of the nuclear power plants. Some opposing residents asked
for a preliminary injunction against the restart. Others filed suit seeking
a permanent injunction against the restart of the nuclear facility, or an
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Japan regulator clears more reactors for restart amid opposition, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 9,
2016), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/11/09/national/japan-regulator-clears-reac
tors-restart-amid-opposition/#.Wb7WDsiGOM8 [https://perma.cc/9SRQ-CNHP].
309 GENSHIRYOKU KISEI IINKAI [NRA], GENSHIRYOKU SHISETSU SHIN-KISEIKIJUN TEKIGOUSEI
SHINSA JOUKYOU [STATUS OF APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL UNDER THE NEW SAFETY STAN-
DARDS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS], http://www.genanshin.jp/facility/map/ [https://perma
.cc/252F-J2NP].
310 Japan reactivates third nuclear power plant after post-Fukushima shutdown, SAN
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injunction ordering the power company to abandon and decommission
the plant.316 Opposing residents cited the Fukushima accident in their
arguments to support the necessity of granting a preliminary or perma-
nent injunction.317
How have the Japanese courts responded to these allegations?
B. Pending Lawsuits Against the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants
The suit against Chubu Electric Power’s Hamaoka nuclear power
plant is still pending. After the Fukushima accident, then Prime Minister
Naoto Kan asked the President of Chubu Electric Power to stop the opera-
tion of the Hamaoka nuclear power plant, insisting that it is vulnerable
to a very powerful tsunami, as was the Fukushima plant.318 The Hamaoka
nuclear power plant is the same type of nuclear power plant as the
Fukushima plant and it is located in an area where the massively power-
ful Nankai Trough Earthquake is expected to strike and leave a direct
effect.319 The request was not legally binding, but the president decided
to accept the prime minister’s request and stopped operation of the
Hamaoka plant in May 2011.320 Afterwards, Chubu Electric Power decided
to decommission reactors No. 1 and No. 2 but is still planning to restart
the remaining reactors.321
Local residents filed suit seeking an injunction against the opera-
tion of the plant in 2002, but the Shizuoka District Court dismissed the
suit in 2007.322 Local residents filed an appeal and now the case is before
316 Plaintiffs drop bid to block restarts of Fukui reactors after high court nixes landmark




318 Prime Minister’s Office, Prime Minister Kan’s Press Interview (May 6, 2011), http://
www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201105/06kaiken.html [https://perma.cc/K529-VJCN];
Anthony Tate, Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant another ticking bomb like Fukushima,
CRITICALITY (Apr. 25, 2011), http://criticality.org/hamaoka-nuclear-power-station-ticking
-bomb-fukushima/ [https://perma.cc/37ML-M3M6].
319 Tate, supra note 318.
320 Chubu Electric Power, About Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station, http://hamaoka.chu
den.jp/english/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z9S5-J3LK].
321 Press Release, Chubu Electric Power, Application for Approval of Hamaoka Nuclear
Power Station Reactors, No. 1 and 2 Decommissioning Plan Submitted (June 1, 2009),
http://www.chuden.co.jp/english/corporate/ecor_releases/erel_pressreleases/3137916
_11098.html [https://perma.cc/GWR3-D8GJ].
322 Shizuoka chihô saibansho [Shizuoka Dist. Ct.], Oct. 26, 2007, TKC database (Japan).
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the Tokyo High Court.323 They argued that the risk of restarting the
Hamaoka nuclear power plant was apparent in light of the Fukushima
nuclear accident.324 It has already been ten years since the appeal but the
arguments are still ongoing.
Local residents also filed suit in the Shizuoka District Court in July
2011 after the Fukushima accident, seeking the permanent abandonment
and decommission of the Hamaoka nuclear power plant.325 The courts are
still reviewing the arguments.326 Of course, the plaintiffs cited the Fuku-
shima accident as support for casting doubt on the safety of the plant.327
C. Lawsuits to Prevent the Restart of Nuclear Power Plants
Local residents also filed suits seeking both permanent and pre-
liminary injunctions against the restart of nuclear power plants.328
On May 1, 2014, the Fukui District Court granted an injunction
against the operation of reactors No. 3 and No. 4 of the Ooi nuclear power
plant operated by Kansai Electric Power.329 This was the first major judicial
decision on the operation of nuclear power plants after the Fukushima
accident. The court held that there was no guarantee the facility would
not be hit by an earthquake more powerful than the strongest antici-
pated earthquake the facility was designed to withstand, per government
safety regulations, and that there was a concrete risk that residents
living within a 250 km radius of the plant would suffer serious damage
if the facility’s cooling system malfunctioned.330 The court also pointed
out that the cooling pool for spent fuel is very vulnerable and could be
destroyed by an earthquake that is less powerful than the maximum one
323 Hamaoka genpatsu sashitome soshô: Souhou ga iken chinjutsu, Tokyo kôsai [Hamaoka
Nuclear Power Plant injunction suit: both parties stated opinions before the Tokyo High
Court] NIKKEI (July 6, 2011), http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASDG06017_W1A700
C1CC0000/ [https://perma.cc/EQN7-4UTB].
324 Id.
325 Hamaoka genpatsu hairo soshô: chubuden ga arasou shisei, shizuoka chisaide hatsu
benron [Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant decommission suit: Chubu Electric Power contests





328 See Ooi genpatsu no unten sahitome meijiru, Fukui chisai ga hanketsu, FUKUI SHIMBUN
(May 21, 2014) (granting the injunction against operation of Ooi Nuclear Power Plant).
329 Fukui chihô saibansho [Fukui Dist. Ct.], May 21, 2014, Hei 24 (W) no. 394, 2228
HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI], at 72 (Japan).
330 Id.
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anticipated, and therefore the current security measures and equipment
were too weak.331
On April 14, 2015, the Fukui District Court granted a preliminary
injunction against the restart of reactors No. 3 and No. 4 of the Takahama
nuclear power plant operated by Kansai Electric Power.332 The Fukui
District Court pointed out that five earthquakes more powerful than the
strongest anticipated earthquake the facility was designed to withstand,
per government safety regulations, hit four different nuclear power
plants since 2005, and there is no guarantee that the Takahama nuclear
power plant would not be hit by an earthquake more powerful than the
strongest anticipated one.333 Moreover, even if the earthquake is not
powerful enough to reach the anticipated magnitude, there is still a risk
of a serious accident if the cooling system malfunctions due to a power
loss or a disruption in the water supply.334 Even the new safety standards
are not demanding enough to preclude the possibility of a serious acci-
dent and are not reasonable.335 As a result, the court found that there is
a concrete danger that the personality rights of all residents living within
250 km of the power plant could be infringed.336
On March 9, 2016, the Otsu District Court similarly granted a
preliminary injunction against the restart of reactors No. 3 and No. 4 of
the Takahama nuclear power plant operated by Kansai Electric Power.337
The Otsu District Court held that, although the ultimate burden of proof
rests with the claimants, the burden of proof of establishing the safety of
the power plant should lay with the power company and, if the power
331 Id.
332 Fukui chihô saibansho [Fukui Dist. Ct.], Apr. 14, 2015, Hei 16 (Yo) no. 31, 2290 HANREI
JIHÔ [HANJI], at 13; Takahama genpatsu no saikadou mitomezu, karishobun, Fukui chisai,
shin kijun wo hitei, SANKEI BIZ (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.sankeibiz.jp/express/news/150
415/exc1504151000001-n1.htm [https://web.archive.org/save/http://www.sankeibiz.jp/ex
press/news/150415/exc1504151000001-n1.htm] (granting the preliminary injunction against
the restart of the Takahama nuclear power plant and rejecting the new safety standards).
333 Fukui chihô saibansho [Fukui Dist. Ct.], April 14, 2015, supra note 332.
334 Id.
335 See id.
336 See id.; see also Fukui chihô saibansho [Fukui Dist. Ct.], May 18, 2015, Hei 27 (Mori)
no. 39, TKC database (Japan) (rejecting the application for the suspension of the prelimi-
nary injunction granted).
337 Otsu chihô saibansho [Otsu Dist. Ct.], Mar. 9, 2016, Hei 20 (Yo) no. 6, 2290 HANREI JIHÔ
[HANJI], at 75 (Japan); Takahama genpatsu 3/4gouki untensashitome, Otsu chisai gakarisho-
bun, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASJ37454PJ37PT
JB00C.html [https://perma.cc/R5R8-8DJQ] (explaining that the court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction against the Takahama nuclear power plant for the first time).
190 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 42:145
company failed to satisfactorily prove the facility’s safety, the decision to
restart plant operations would be deemed unreasonable.338 In light of the
severity of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the court held that the
safety standard needed to be sufficiently demanding to prevent devastat-
ing disasters even if necessary countermeasures failed.339 Since the cause
of the Fukushima nuclear accident was still unclear, the court said, there
is grave concern about the sufficiency of the new safety standard adopted
after the accident.340 With respect to the Takahama nuclear power plant,
the court pointed out that the government underestimated the maximum
magnitude of earthquakes that could happen directly below the power
plant and the safety standards to be met were inadequate. Evidence indi-
cating the existence of previous tremendous tsunamis was also ignored,
thus casting doubt on the adequacy of counter-tsunami measures.341
Furthermore, the safety standard for cooling pools for spent nuclear fuel
is far more lax than that for the nuclear vessel, and there is no sufficient
protocol to address a cooling water leak from the cooling pool.342 Lastly,
the court cast doubt on the adequacy of the evacuation plan established
by the municipal government and held that significant active interven-
tion by the central government was essential.343 As a result, the court
found that there is a high possibility that the personality rights of the
resident plaintiffs could be infringed, granting preliminary injunction.344
Kansai Electric Power applied to the Otsu District Court for the
suspension of the preliminary injunction, but the Otsu District Court
dismissed the application.345 Furthermore, the Otsu District Court dis-
missed the objection filed by Kansai Electric Power against the prelimi-
nary injunction.346 Kansai Electric Power has appealed to the Osaka





343 Otsu chihô saibansho, [Otsu Dist. Ct.] Mar. 9, 2016, supra note 337.
344 Id.
345 Otsu chihô saibansho [Otsu Dist. Ct.], June 17, 2016, unreported; see also Ichijo &
Yuko, Takahama genpatsu, saikadou mitomezu, Kanden moushitate kyakka, Otsu chisai,
MAINICHI SHIMBUN (June 17, 2016), http://mainichi.jp/articles/20160617/k00/00e/040/166
000c [https://perma.cc/FC6E-9N6V] (dismissing Kansai Electric Power’s application and
denying the restart).
346 Otsu chihô saibansho [Otsu Dist. Ct.], July 12, 2016, Hei 20 (M) no. 12, 1 TKC
database (Japan); see also Kanden Takahama genpatsu, hutatabi unten mitomezu, Otsu
chisai igishin kettei, NIKKEI SHIMBUN (July 12, 2016), http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGX
LASHC11H4A_S6A710C1000000/ [https://perma.cc/78Q5-NF4B] (dismissing the objection
and denying the restart of the Takahama nuclear power plant).
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High Court.347 But until the Osaka High Court overturns the judgment,
Kansai Electric Power is precluded from restarting reactors No. 3 and
No. 4 of the Takahama nuclear power plant.
On the other hand, on April 16, 2013, the Osaka District Court
rejected the preliminary injunction suits against reactors No. 3 and No.
4 of the Ooi nuclear power plant operated by Kansai Electric Power.348
The court believed that the plaintiffs failed to prove the concrete possi-
bility that they would suffer serious damage resulting from a serious
accident at the nuclear power plant.349 Moreover, the Fukui District Court
reversed the preliminary injunction order of the same court against the
Takahama nuclear power plant on December 24, 2015.350 The Fukui
District Court upheld the new safety standards of the NRA and its appli-
cation to reactors No. 3 and No. 4 of the Takahama nuclear power plant,
holding that there is nothing unreasonable in the NRA’s judgement.351
It thus concluded that there is no concrete danger that the personality
right of the resident plaintiffs would be infringed.352 The same court on
the same day dismissed a suit for a preliminary injunction against the
restart of reactors No. 3 and No. 4 of the Ooi nuclear power plant operated
by Kansai Electric Power.353 Since the review on the reactors of the Ooi
nuclear power plant by NRA was still pending, the court concluded that
there was no urgent need to issue a preliminary injunction.354 Furthermore,
on April 22, 2015, the Kagoshima District Court dismissed the applica-
tion for a preliminary injunction against reactors No. 1 and No. 2 of the
Sendai nuclear power plant operated by Kyushu Electric Power.355 Upon
347 Koukokushin toshiakeikouni handan: Takahama genpatsu, kôsai de hatsu shinjin,
SANKEI WEST (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.sankei.com/west/news/161013/wst1610130073
-n1.html [https://perma.cc/C3J2-PQH2] (noting that a hearing before the High Court will
take place next year).
348 Osaka chihô saibansho [Osaka Dist.Ct.], April 16, 2013, Hei 24 (Yo) no. 262, 2193
HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI], at 44, http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_jp/259/083259_hanrei
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CTD-C2C8] (Japan).
349 Id.
350 Fukui chihô saibansho [Fukui Dist. Ct.], Dec. 24, 2015, 2290 HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI], at
29 (Japan); Takahama genpatsu no saikadou mitomeru, Fukui chisai, karishobun torikeshi,
NIKKEI SHIMBUN (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASDG24H3O_U5A
221C1000000/ [https://perma.cc/H4E6-WJQW].
351 Fukui chihô saibansho, supra note 350.
352 Id.
353 Fukui chihô saibansho [Fukui Dist. Ct.], Dec. 24, 2015, 2290 HANREI JIHO [HANJI], at
73 (Japan).
354 See id.
355 Kagoshima chihô saibansho [Kagoshima Dist. Ct.], Apr. 22, 2015, Hei 16 (Yo) no. 36
2290 HANREI JIHÔ, at 147 (Japan); see also Sendai genpatsu, saikadou sashitome shinsei
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appeal, the Fukuoka High Court, Miyazaki Branch, dismissed the appeal
on April 6, 2016, upholding the Kagoshima District Court’s decision to
reject the preliminary injunction.356
Then, finally, the Osaka High Court overturned the decision of the
Otsu District Court, which had granted a preliminary injunction against
reactivation of the No. 3 and No. 4 reactors of the Takahama nuclear
power plant operated by Kansai Electric Power on March 28, 2017.357 The
Osaka High Court confirmed the framework of analysis following other
courts, holding that if the nuclear power plant does not satisfy the gov-
ernment safety standards, then it could be concluded that it has a concrete
risk of harming the life and health of the local residents but that the
plaintiffs seeking injunction need to satisfy the burden of proof that the
nuclear power plant involved does not satisfy the safety standards.358 In
light of the fact, however, that the nuclear power company has all the data
on safety of the plant and all the materials submitted to the safety re-
view, the power company needs to prove that the plant satisfied the safety
standards with sufficient grounds.359 If the power company fails to prove
this, then it could be assumed that the power plant presents concrete
danger of harming the life and health of local residents.360 If it succeeds
in proving this, then it is up to plaintiff local residents to prove that the
government safety standards were unreasonable or that there was some
unreasonable applications in the safety review.361
Then, the Osaka High Court approved that the powerfulness of
an earthquake can be used as a basic standard, which has been upheld
by the NRA, using all the standard formulae to estimate the likelihood,
powerfulness, and risk of the influence of faults as satisfying the govern-
ment standards.362 With respect to countermeasures against a powerful
wo kyakka, karishobunde Kagoshima chisai, NIKKEI SHIMBUN (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www
.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASJC22H0U_S5A420C1000000/ [https://perma.cc/KFX7-4N5K]
(dismissing the Application for Preliminary Injunction against the Restart of Sendai
Nuclear Power Plant).
356 Fukuoka kôtô saibansho, Miyazaki shibu [Fukuoka High Ct. Miyazaki Branch], Apr. 6,
2016, TKC database (Japan); see also Sendai ganpatsu: Sashitome mitomezu, Shin-kiseikijun
hugouri towa iezu, MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Apr. 6, 2016), https://mainichi.jp/articles/201604
06/k00/00e/040/201000c [https://perma.cc/YCC9-D5A8] (denying the injunction and holding
that the new regulatory standards are not unreasonable).





362 Osaka kôtô saibansho [Osaka High Ct.], Mar. 28, 2017, supra note 357.
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earthquake, the power company added 830 reinforcements and confirmed
that the plant could withstand the standard earthquake and the NRA
also confirmed this.363 With respect to countermeasures against the possi-
ble tsunami, the power plant estimated the possible height of a tsunami
and introduced various countermeasures to the satisfaction of the NRA.364
The power plant further added sufficient countermeasures including a
countermeasure against total power loss, also to the satisfaction of the
NRA.365 Although the exact extent of damage and cause of the Fukushima
nuclear power plant accident is not fully clarified, the Osaka High Court
held that the basic outline of events are already confirmed by various
investigation teams and new safety standards were adopted by incorpo-
rating the lessons of the accident.366 The new safety standards can be
viewed as reasonable.367 The court thus denied the arguments of the local
residents that the power plant lacks sufficient safety measures and de-
nied preliminary injunction.368
Therefore, the stance of the lower courts is split. But it looks like
many courts still adhere to their previous stance and pay a very strong
deference to the judgment of the government and nuclear experts, limiting
their own reviews only to whether the government judgment was grossly
unreasonable. Many courts still believe that the nuclear power plants
approved by the government raise no concrete possibility of accident or
harm despite the Fukushima nuclear accident.369
D. Japanese Courts in the Post-Fukushima Era
It is remarkable that even in the post-Fukushima era many courts
are willfully blind to the possibility of serious damage raised by the local
residents in the civil suits filed against power companies over the safety





367 Osaka kôtô saibansho [Osaka High Ct.], Mar. 28, 2017, supra note 357.
368 Id. Upon the decision of the Osaka High Court, No. 3 and No. 4 reactors of the
Takahama nuclear power plant were reactivated again.
369 See also Hiroshima chihô saibansho [Hiroshima Dist. Ct.], Mar. 30, 2017, TKC data-
base (Japan) (rejecting the application for preliminary injunction against the restart of
Reactor No. 3 of the Ikata nuclear power plant); Saga chihô saibansho [Saga Dist. Ct.],
Mar. 20, 2015, TKC database (Japan) (rejecting a suit against the use of MOX fuel at the
Genkai nuclear power plant operated by the Kyushu Electric Power).
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It may be understandable for the courts to defer to the judgment
of a regulatory agency supported by experts in the context of an adminis-
trative case against the government agency.370 Even in the United States,
the United States Supreme Court has been very reluctant to require
additional steps in the procedure371 and has been extremely reluctant to
subject a decision by the NRC to a searching review.372 Even after the
Fukushima accident, courts in the United States are generally very sup-
portive of nuclear power.373
But in light of the government’s catastrophic failure to regulate
the safety of nuclear power plants, it is doubtful whether the courts
should continue to blindly place their faith in the expert knowledge of the
government regulatory agency and its commitment to protect the public
safety in administrative cases. It is more persuasive now to allow for a
more searching judicial review on the sufficiency of government regula-
tion.374 A more searching judicial review would make more sense especially
because public participation in the permit-granting process is restricted
and there is a critical shortage of information.375
370 But see Saikô saibansho [Sup. Ct.], April 16, 2013, 3rd petty bench, 67: 4 SAIKÔ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÛ [MINSHÛ], at 1115 (Japan) (holding that in a revocation suit
against the refusal to admit the eligibility to receive compensation for Minamata disease,
the reviewing court should not review whether the decision was unreasonable or not but
whether the applicants should be found to suffer Minamata disease to receive the
compensation).
371 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
372 Metropolitan Edison Company v. People against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
See also Sheldon L. Trubatch, How, Why and When the United States Supreme Court Sup-
ports Nuclear Power, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & P. 1 (2012); Richard Lazarus, The National
Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek behind the
Curtains, 100 GER. L. J. 1507 (2012).
373 Joel Yellin, Judicial Review and Nuclear Power: Assessing the Risks of Environmental
Catastrophe, 45 G. WASH. L. REV. 969 (1977). In New York v. U.S. NRC, 681 F.3d 471
(D.C.Cir. 2012), the Court of Appeal for the District Circuit ordered NRC to consider the
possibility that the permanent waste disposal site for high level nuclear waste may not
be built under the National Environmental Policy Act. See Hillary H. Harnett, New York
v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 589, 595 (2013). But,
once NRC reconsidered and decided that the permanent storage of high level nuclear
waste does not raise serious risk, the court has backed off. New York v. U.S. NRC, 824
F.3d 1012, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2016). See Amanda Matos, Thousands of Half-Lives to Go:
Weighing the Risks of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, 23 J. L. & POL’Y 305 (2014).
374 Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial
Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 757–58 (2011);
Katherine A. Trisolini, Decisions, Disasters, and Deference: Rethinking Agency Expertise
after Fukuhshima, 33 YALE L & POL’Y REV. 323,325 (2015).
375 For the necessity of allowing more public participation, see Anthony Z. Roisman, Erin
Honaker, & Ethan Spaner, Regulating Nuclear Power in the New Millennium (The Role
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Regardless of the level of deference the courts should pay to an
administrative agency in a suit against the grant of a permit by the gov-
ernment, courts are not obliged to defer to the judgement of a government
regulatory agency or power company in the civil injunction cases. The
Ikata nuclear power plant case involved a revocation suit against the gov-
ernment and its holding is not applicable to civil suits. It is in this sense
surprising that the courts applied the same kind of deference in the past,
even in civil suits filed by local residents against the power companies.
But more fundamentally, in the post-Fukushima era, it would make
more sense for the judiciary to keep at least a searching review on the
safety of the nuclear power plant in civil suits against power companies
for several reasons.
First of all, the high number of earthquakes in Japan create a
high probability that a massive earthquake could hit a nuclear power
plant. The government and experts estimate the magnitude of these
earthquakes and ensure that the power plant can withstand these antic-
ipated powerful earthquakes. But there is no guarantee that a more
powerful than anticipated earthquake will never occur in Japan. Almost
no one anticipated that an earthquake as powerful as the Tohoku Earth-
quake could hit Japan, especially since such a powerful earthquake has
never hit Japan before. In this sense, it is not surprising that almost no
one expected it to happen. But now it has become apparent that such an
unanticipated massive earthquake could strike any part of Japan. Gov-
ernment estimates on earthquakes anticipated to affect particular nuclear
power plants are based on past experience and are very conservative. It
would make more sense to require that power plants can withstand very
powerful earthquakes even if the likelihood is remote.
Nuclear power plants are planned and constructed to withstand
earthquakes with help from computer simulations. Computers can pro-
vide the best insight on the resilience of the nuclear power plant in the
event of an earthquake. But that is merely a simulation. No one knows
whether the nuclear power plant can actually withstand such a powerful
earthquake. The government, as well as TEPCO, believes that there was
no serious structural damage due to the earthquake itself this time. But
there is no guarantee that any serious structural damages will not hap-
pen in the future.
of the Public), 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 317 (2009); Joseph Spivey, Beyond Entergy Nuclear
Vermont Yankee: Preserving Public Agency in Nuclear Regulation, 25 TULANE ENVTL.
L.J. 473 (2012).
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Furthermore, predicting an earthquake is very difficult. The Japa-
nese disaster prevention model is built on the presumption that it is
possible to predict, and thus prepare for, an earthquake. The safety of
the nuclear power plant is supported by the fact that the plant will be
able to withstand the most powerful earthquake that is anticipated to hit
the plant within some margin of error. Yet, the Tohoku Earthquake
proved that predicting earthquakes is still very difficult. Some experts
thus openly argued that it would be better to focus on damage mitigation
instead of earthquake prediction.376 Rather than making sure that there
would be no serious damage due to the most powerful anticipated earth-
quake, it might be better to be prepared to mitigate the damage, that is
to say, to prevent any fatal damage from occurring even if the plant is
seriously damaged. It is doubtful whether current nuclear power plants
are designed, constructed, and operated in accordance to this philosophy.
Finally, even if the plant can withstand a simulated powerful earth-
quake, the plant is built by humans, which raises the possibility of human
error. Although many maintenance and operation tasks are accomplished
automatically by computers, ultimately it is humans that need to maintain
the plant and supervise its operation. There is no guarantee that the
plant is built and maintained by humans without any problems. Errors
in constructing or maintaining crucial safety components in the power
plant could compromise the facility’s ability to withstand powerful
earthquakes. Because of these mistakes, there is a potential risk that a
powerful earthquake could damage or destroy the power plant.
As a result, instead of blindly relying upon the government and
experts, it may be better to allow the judiciary to scrutinize the design,
construction, operation plan, and all other security measures to make
sure that there is nothing wrong with them. Prior to the Fukushima
accident, most courts reviewed whether the judgment of the government
was unreasonable or not when dealing with administrative suits. Even
in civil suits, the courts practically presumed that nuclear power plants,
licensed by the government after a safety review, were safe. In actual
practice, the courts are not paying deference but are simply accepting the
judgment of the government and experts without much scrutiny. Their
reviews were toothless. Now everyone knows that we cannot blindly trust
the experts and the government after the Fukushima accident. It is
therefore more apt to expect the courts to review the judgments of the
376 Don’t rely on quake predictions, JAPAN TIMES (July 7, 2016), https://www.japantimes.co.jp
/opinion/2016/07/07/editorials/don’t-rely-quake-predictions/ [https://perma.cc/DJ4U-8UKB].
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government with more bite in order to force the power companies to
defend the safety of their facilities in civil suits.
The Japanese courts may be afraid that the judgments on nuclear
technology require a significantly higher degree of expert knowledge that
judges may not have. Or perhaps they fear that since the development
of nuclear power is highly political and controversial, they should avoid
interfering with the government’s decision to allow power companies to
build and operate nuclear power plants, leaving the choice to the public
to make through election.
Surely, judges are not experts on nuclear technology. Judges are
legal professionals and are not required to have the technical and sci-
entific background for everything. They can, however, use their legal
skills with proper assistance from other experts to question whether the
judgment of the government could be justified and whether there is a
concrete possibility of a serious accident. Also, no matter how political or
controversial the issue is, that is not an excuse to avoid facing the issue.
Even if both the government and a large majority of the people support
nuclear power, that is not an excuse to turn a blind eye to the judgment
of the government or the power companies. It is understandable that
judges are hesitant to issue injunctions unless they are persuaded that
there is a high probability that a serious accident could happen and sig-
nificantly affect local residents. But now, everyone knows that such acci-
dents do happen and that local residents are seriously affected. In light
of the seriousness and magnitude of the consequences, it makes sense for
the courts to require much higher safety standards for nuclear power
plants. Judges should not hesitate to issue an injunction if there is a doubt
over whether the nuclear power plant is well structured and equipped
with sufficient safety measures or whether all the safeguards designed
to mitigate damages from accidents are actually well prepared.377
377 Or, the courts might be simply imposing a much higher threshold for injunction suits
relative to damage suits. Indeed, the Japanese courts did not hesitate to hold TEPCO
liable for the nuclear damage caused by the Fukushima accident. Osaka chihô saibansho
[Osaka Dist. Ct.], Sept. 16, 2015, 2294 HANREI JIHÔ, at 89 (Japan); Kyoto chihô saibansho
[Kyoto Dist. Ct.], Feb. 18, 2016, TKC database (Japan); Sapporo chihô saibansho
[Sapporo Dist. Ct.], Mar. 18, 2016, TKC database (Japan); Tokyo chihô saibansho [Tokyo
Dist. Ct.], May 25, 2016, TKC database (Japan). For the statutory scheme on compensa-
tion for damages caused by nuclear accidents, see Eric A. Feldman, Fukushima: Catastrophe,
Compensation, and Justice in Japan, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (2013); Eric A. Feldman,
Compensating the Victims of Japan’s 3-11 Fukushima Disaster, 16 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. &
POL’Y J. 127 (2015). It is still an open question whether the government has any liability
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CONCLUSION
Nuclear power is a very controversial and sensitive issue in Japan.
Although many people have serious concerns with the safety of nuclear
power plants, not many people argue for the total abolition of nuclear
power immediately.378 However, many people doubt the appropriateness
of the new safety standards adopted by the NRA and oppose restarting
power plants even if they satisfy the new standards.379 Polls indicate that
only 18% of the public thought that the nuclear experts are trustworthy,
while 31.7% feel that nuclear experts were not trustworthy.380 A miser-
able 9.2% of the public report that the government can be counted on, but
51% consider the government untrustworthy.381 In light of this distrust,
blind deference to the government and experts with respect to the safety
of nuclear power plants simply does not make any sense.
It is up to the people to choose whether to keep nuclear power. It
is possible to abandon all nuclear power just as the German government
did.382 If the people decide to keep it, it then becomes crucial to see whether
we can predict the power of earthquakes and whether we can ensure the
safety of nuclear power plants while adopting additional safeguards to
for its failure to secure the safety of a nuclear power plant. Joel Rheuben, Government
Liability for Regulatory Failure in the Fukushima Disaster: A Common Law Comparison,
23 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL’Y J. 113, 134 (2014).
378 A poll indicated that 14.8% of the respondents supported immediate abandonment of
nuclear power, while 47.9% of the respondents supported gradual reduction and ultimate
abandonment. Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (“JAERO”), Genshiryoku
riyô nikansuru yoron chousa 2015 [Public Opinion Survey on the Use of Nuclear Power
2015], http://www.jaero.or.jp/data/01jigyou/survey_pickup.html [https://perma.cc/DE42
-CGL4] [hereinafter JAERO Survey].
379 The 2015 public poll indicated that 58% of the respondents opposed the restart of
nuclear reactors even if they satisfied the new safety standards., Zenkoku yoron chousa:
genpatsu saikadou hantai ga 58%, 74% hinan dekinai [Public poll indicates that 58% of the
public opposed to the restart of the power plant, 74% citing the difficulty of evacuation],
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/feature/nucerror/list
/CK2015092002100006.html [https://perma.cc/L46X-EY4G].
380 JAERO Survey, supra note 378.
381 Id.
382 Gerd Winter, The Rise and Fall of Nuclear Energy Use in Germany: Processes, Expla-
nations and the Role of Law, 25:1 J ENVTL. L. 95 (2013); Lincoln L. Davies & Alexis Jones,
Fukushima’s Shadow, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1083, 1098 (2015). For the international
response to the Fukushima accident, see Stephen G. Burns, The Fukushima Daiichi Acci-
dent: The International Community Responds, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. 739,
745 (2012); Emily Benz, Lessons from Fukushima: Strengthening the International Regula-
tion of Nuclear Energy, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 845, 863–64 (2013).
2017] T-REX, JURASSIC PARK AND NUCLEAR POWER 199
mitigate the possible damages.383 It is true that there are so many errors
and deficiencies which contributed to the Fukushima accident. In retro-
spect, therefore, it is easy to say that all these errors could have been
avoided and the nuclear power plant could be safely constructed and
operated if sufficient safeguards were to be introduced and all counter-
measures were to be adopted.384 Nevertheless, how we can be sure that
the different kinds of errors might not bring another nuclear disaster?
John Hammond attempted to bring dinosaurs back to life using the
DNA from blood preserved inside insects encased in amber to create a
dinosaur theme park, Jurassic Park, and used all available technologies
to contain the dinosaurs inside the park in order to secure the safety of the
visitors. However, could we really contain and control T-Rex? Ian Malcolm,
a mathematician and chaos theory expert, was pessimistic on this issue
after he was invited to preview the park. The Fukushima accident forces
us to reconsider this basic question now with respect to earthquakes and
nuclear power plants.
383 Massive disasters might not be the best things to prompt overall re-evaluation of
energy law and policy, but everyone needs to learn lessons from the past failures. Lincoln
L. Davies, Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law, 2011 BYU
L. REV. 1937, 1989 (2011).
384 Acton & Hibbs, supra note 246, at 3–4.
